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Abstract
This thesis explores the crime of genocide in connectivity to ‘gendercides’. Its aim is to 
investigate whether including gender groups as a protected group in the Genocide Convention 
is theoretically plausible. Drawing from feminist legal theory, the thesis begins by probing the 
historical origins of the concept of genocide and critically approaching the criminal elements 
of genocide. This exposition emanates into an analytical examination of the rationale of 
protecting human groups in ICL. Against this background, the thesis advocates an 
understanding of the crime of genocide as a rights-implementing institute. Subsequently, it 
employs an ejusdem generis analysis to assess whether gender groups are coherent with the 
current canon of the protected groups, and if similar treatment thereby can be motivated. It 
then turns to examine other international law instruments, to expose that none of these are 
suitable proxies in dealing with ‘gendercides’. In answer to this ‘legal reality’, the thesis 
examines the conceptual underpinnings of international criminal regulation, to explicate that 
‘gendercides’ fit this theoretical frame, using the ‘Indian gendercide’ as an illustrative setting. 
From this perspective, the thesis suggests that the content of the crime of genocide is not 
determinate, but  rather emerges as a battlefield for hegemonic interests. Therefore, it is 
argued, the current construction of the protected groups in the Genocide Convention in the 
way it  relates to gender groups reflects a deliberate choice. The thesis concludes with 
asserting that this ‘choice’ represents a lacuna in ICL, that in the long run compromises the 
legitimacy  of the crime of genocide, since the personal scope of the crime of genocide risks 
being in discord with current social and political trajectories.
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1 ‘Gendercide’ and Genocide – an Introduction to the Thesis†
1.1 A Lacuna in ICL? Development of the Topic
Throughout history, mankind has proven itself capable of performing the most horrendous 
acts towards each other. Some of the worst  of such atrocities are ascribed the locution 
‘genocide’. Subsequent to the Holocaust, the ‘international society’ started treating genocide 
as a substantive crime under international criminal law (ICL), instead of a regrettable 
consequence of State sovereignty.1 The crime of genocide has been regarded by some to stand 
at the apex of international criminality, labelling it  the ‘crime of crimes’.2 Constructing an act 
as genocide will always express denunciatory  implications, bearing strong connotations to 
value-based considerations. Exposing such undertones highlight the close connection between 
law and politics in ICL.3
The crime of genocide is defined in Article II of the UN’s Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (hereinafter ‘the Genocide Convention’).4 
The Article specifies that certain acts intended to destroy, in part or in whole, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group  are condemned as genocide. The personal scope, however, 
has not always been limited to the enumerated collectives. That was a demarcation made 
during the Genocide Convention’s drafting process. In consequence, ‘genocidal’ acts 
committed with ‘genocidal’ intent, when directed against  other groups, for instance gender 
groups, are not constructed as genocide – if departing from a formalist interpretation of 
Article II of the Genocide Convention. This creates a discrepancy, perhaps even a lacuna, 
within the ICL system.
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† I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to my supervisor Mikael Baaz for all your wise reflections, 
intelligent remarks and inspiring guidance throughout this research. Also, a special thank you to Anna-Gabrielle.
1 I define the ‘international society’  as a group of independent political communities, not only forming a system, 
in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have 
established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and 
recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.  Cf. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), 
The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1. 
2 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S. Judgement and Sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 16.
3 For more on this subject, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2011).
4 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 Dec 1948), 78 UNTS 277.
The following narrative can serve to explicate this inconsistency. A community is 
suffering from over-population. To gain control over its population size, it  decides that all 
families may only  have one child. Since the imagined community adheres to a draconian 
interpretation of primogeniture, the child must be male. In consequence, all female-born 
children under this period must be discarded. Granted, this situation may be hyperbolic. At 
the same time, however, it is not far removed from the sex-selection practices of various 
collectives throughout the world. The same conduct and intent directed against members of 
any of the enumerated groups in Article II would with all likelihood amount to genocide. That 
would, in turn, construct the victims as victims of genocide. The same can not be said for the 
girls in our narrative. ICL distinguishes between the collectives and the deaths of their 
members through legal terminology of inclusion and exclusion. Does this current state of 
affairs emerge as problematic? Inspired by  post-modern research in ICL, the thesis delves 
deeper into this inquiry  the way it  relates to gender groups. Hannah Arendt explores a similar 
notion. The following statement can serve as an illustrative point of departure.
If genocide is an actual possibility of the future,  then no people on earth [...] can feel reasonably sure of 
its continued existence without the help and the protection of international law.5
1.2 The Theoretical Plausibility of Protecting Gender Groups – the Purpose of 
the Thesis
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate whether including gender groups as a protected 
group in the Genocide Convention is theoretically plausible.6 The objective can be understood 
as seeking to bring to surface the underlying world of beliefs that permeate the institutional 
practices of rendering particular groups ‘protected’ for the purposes of the Genocide 
Convention.7 The thesis does not, however, suggest that what is needed is to implement more 
7
5 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 
273. 
6 The purpose is heavily influenced by Martti Koskenniemi. See his, ‘What is Critical Research in International 
Law? Celebrating Structuralism’, 29(3) Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), pp. 727-735, p. 732 (‘What 
does one need to believe in order to think that rule X instead of Y should be applied.’).
7 The phraseology draws from Martti Koskenniemi, and how he views critical research in international law. See 
ibid, p. 733 (‘The question [...] aims to bring to the surface that underlying world of beliefs that controls our 
institutional practices, and accounts for the way decisions are made and resources are distributed.’).
policies and rules. Rather, it advocates a better understanding of what transpires beneath the 
surface of the application of Article II of the Genocide Convention.8  The aim here is to 
highlight which conditions enable particular legal choices to appear theoretically plausible 
and may consequently  be rejected or approved. The ‘choices’ underline implicit assumptions 
about the epistemology, ideology  and other ‘truths’ that have been accepted in more or less 
feckless terms within the judicial construction.9  It is these background assumptions that the 
phrasing of the purpose sets out to explicate. This will be done by virtue of the following 
main questions:
1. What are the historical origins of the concept of genocide and what  is the legal locus 
of the explicitly protected groups in Article II of the Genocide Convention?
2. Why is the protection of human ‘groups’ relevant for ICL, and what are the inherent 
problems in delineating them for legal as well as social purposes?
3. Are other international law instruments adequate in responding to ‘gendercides’, and 
does ‘gendercide’ fit the underlying theoretical justifications for criminal regulation 
in the international arena as well as the overarching aims of the ICL system?
1.3 Delimitations
Conducting research on the crime of genocide and the protected groups in Article II of the 
Genocide Convention could surely engross an entire academic career. To steer clear of such 
dilemmas, some delimitations are necessary. Possibly the most conspicuous is the decision to 
refrain from evaluating post-Genocide Convention evolution in customary international law. 
The delimitation is motivated by the fact that such an analysis would require an all to wide 
scope and is not proportionally relevant in achieving the stated aim of the thesis. Essentially, 
it is a question of economics of space. For the same reasons, I have made the decision to not 
address questions relating to jus ad bellum or humanitarian intervention.
A further demarcation is made when actualising gender groups against the backdrop  of 
human rights. Here, I venture – to some extent  – into rights theory. That is, however, only in a 
very limited manner. The question of rights theory is undoubtedly  a complex one. A complete 
8
8 See ibid, p. 730.
9 The structure of the argument is, essentially, mirrored by Martti Koskenniemi. See ibid, p. 730.
account would steal focus from the main questions of the thesis. In consequence, I will only 
superficially account for rights theory in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.4.
Regarding the analysis of other instruments of international law, amongst them crimes 
against humanity, I have decided not to discuss theories of criminal cumulation to a 
significant degree. This decision is motivated by the fact that such a perspective would not 
further the purpose of the thesis to a discernible extent.
Lastly, the thesis will not depart from an intersectional perspective. This omission could 
be argued to comprise a drawback in the theoretical framework of the thesis, seeing as the 
research is inspired by feminist legal theory and intersectionality is, I would argue, paramount 
for feminist  research. It is, however, my contention that a too high regard to intersectionality 
would cause some common tendencies to be lost through making experiences too 
individualised. Since I seek to approach ‘gender’ as a relatively isolated factor and to be able 
to engage in a deepened discussion relating to what that aspect entails, it is not within the 
purpose of the thesis to deal with intersectional issues. It is, however, mainly for space 
reasons I have not used an intersectional perspective.
1.4 Theoretical Points of Departure
1.4.1 How Is the Thesis Inspired by Feminist Legal Theory?
It is valuable for the sake of intersubjectivity to acknowledge which perspective of reality the 
researcher employs as a point of departure, since the employed theoretical perspective 
impacts the results of the study. In the thesis, the normative starting point  is that  I oppose a 
construction of genocide that involves a locked system of rules and terms. Rather, I find it 
valuable to establish a pluralistic, socio-oriented legal construction of genocide that, inter 
alia, sets out to
face reality, to apply the relevant scientific theories and methods to illuminate the various issues,  to 
produce a form of knowledge that is, in one sense or another, practically relevant and to leave previous 
theories and views when the experience shows that they are no longer durable.10
In light of the overarching normative starting point, the thesis will draw inspiration from 
feminist legal theory as it is construed by  Nicola Lacey. According to her, the notion of 
feminist legal theory goes beyond a feminist critique of certain provisions, by  virtue of 
9
10 Jørgen Dahlberg-Larsen, Pragmatisk Retsteori (København: Jurist & Økonomforbundets forlag, 2001), p. 103.
enabling the viewing of the entire system of provisions from a general and structural 
perspective.11 The fundamental position of feminist legal theory  is thus that ‘gender’ affects 
law and our understanding of it. Analytically, a central concern with feminist legal theory is 
structural biases in particular positions of inequality – and to investigate how these positions 
are constructed, reproduced and how power aspects are actualised in a ‘legal’ setting. 
Politically, the use of feminist legal theory  contends that the way ‘gender’ has formed the 
legal domain is inherently  politically and morally cumbersome, in that gender is an axle not 
only of differentiation, but also of discrimination, domination or oppression.12 
Methodologically, the starting point for feminist legal theory is that knowledge is socially 
constructed and contextual; that the power and meaning of gender is a product not of nature 
but of culture. I include all the above mentioned aspects as points of departure in the thesis.
Employing feminist legal theory as an influence render us capable to contest the most 
‘natural’ concepts, in order to expose an underlying world of beliefs inherent in the legal 
system. An underlying world of beliefs is here to be understood as a process – something that 
is created in social interaction between people, as opposed to fixed structures, existing 
independently of time and space. In that sense, the theoretical influence feminist legal theory 
provides is closely linked to the purpose of the thesis. By virtue of uncovering such a 
dimension, a social and political change may be achieved. Put in other words: reality  can be 
changed. ‘Changing’ reality is in this context to be understood as moving towards 
establishing, as stated above, a pluralistic, socio-oriented legal construction of genocide. The 
conceptual frame developed herein can therefore be characterised as critical legal studies, 
having an emancipatory interest of knowledge.13
1.4.2 Using ‘Gendercide’ as a Theoretical Framework in ICL
As a way of introducing gender as an analytical concept in the research, I frame my 
investigation of the intersection between gender groups and genocide through the theoretical 
10
11 Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects – Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1988), pp. 2-3.
12 Ibid.
13 In this context, it should be noted that the Swedish strand of research ‘genusrättsvetenskap’ in many ways 
mirrors the emancipatory interest of knowledge here. See Åsa Gunnarsson and Eva-Maria Svensson, 
Genusrättsvetenskap (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2009), pp. 116f.
lens of ‘gendercide’.14 I have chosen to use Judith Butler’s gender theory as inspiration in 
understanding the gender-prefix in the term ‘gendercide’. In the following section, I seek to 
develop how the concept is to be used as a theoretical framework in the thesis.
The locution ‘gendercide’, a semantic corollary of genocide, is an analytical term first 
expounded by Mary Anne Warren. She defined it as ‘the deliberate extermination of persons 
of a particular sex (or gender)’.15  This definition is mirrored in the thesis. Warren probed 
deliberate extermination of women, through analysing historical events such as female 
infanticide, witch-hunts in Early Modern Europe, Sati (commonly known as widow burning) 
and other atrocities committed against women.16 Warren’s approach, however, has in recent 
time been expanded to ‘analysis of the extent to which males are targeted on the basis of 
gender’.17 In line with these developments, ‘gendercide’ came to be perceived as a sex-neutral 
term, meaning that the victims could be ‘either men or women’.18 The theoretical framework 
enables us to view the protected groups pursuant to Article II of the Genocide Convention 
from a critical perspective, exposing problems that arise in the nexus of gender and genocide. 
In particular, the ‘gendercide’ framework highlights that gender roles have often had lethal 
consequences and that these are in important aspects comparable to the lethal consequences 
of, inter alia, ethnic and racial prejudice.
Notwithstanding its potential merits, the use of ‘gendercide’ as a theoretical framework 
lends itself to some conceptual difficulties. In lack of a unified theory of ‘gendercide’, there 
has been diverging use of the term. Analytical inconsistency has ensued.19  Within the 
dominating paradigm of research relating to ‘gendercides’, the prevailing view of gender is 
that it ‘can be defined primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of biological sex’.20 This is a 
11
14 The contributions of Adam Jones have been seminal in furthering the ‘gendercide’ debate. See Adam Jones, 
New Directions in Genocide Research (London: Routledge, 2012).
15  Mary Anne Warren, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1985), p. 22.
16 Ibid.
17  Charli Carpenter, ‘Beyond “Gendercide”: Incorporating Gender into Comparative Gendercide Studies’,  6(4) 
The International Journal of Human Rights (2002), pp. 77-101, p. 78.
18 Mary Anne Warren, supra n. 15, p. 22.
19 Charli Carpenter, supra n. 17, pp. 79-81.
20 Adam Jones, Gendercide and Genocide (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004), p. 186.
view contrasting to the feminist legal theory that influences my research. Such a definition 
constructs a substantially narrow conceptualisation of gender as an analytical concept. 
Against this background, it  has been suggested that the notion of ‘gendercide’ is best limited 
to a catchphrase.21 In this regard, Charli Carpenter proposes that gender must be distinguished 
from sex for the theory to yield successful results.22  Such a partition, she claims, is 
particularly important, if we want to use gender as an analytical category that goes beyond 
sex-selective killings.23  To that end, Carpenter perceives sex and gender as dichotomies, 
whereby sex is biologically given and gender is a social process. I find her division 
problematic, with a consequence being that sex implicitly becomes perceived as something 
stable, coherent and pre-discoursive.24
To build an appropriate theory  of ‘gendercide’, inspired by feminist legal theory, there is 
reason to elaborate the employed perspective of gender, as it defines the ontology of the 
theoretical framework and draws the contours for what a ‘gender group’ is. In this regard, 
Butler has criticised the dichotomy sex/gender.25  It is hard to overstate the impact of her 
research in gender studies.26 For that reason, and since it is suitable for my research, Butler’s 
gender theory will be used as inspiration in understanding the gender-prefix in ‘gendercide’. 
She argues that both sex and gender are culturally  contingent constructions, and that gender 
precedes sex. Sex is therefore, according to Butler, subordinated to gender.27 The relationship 
between sex and gender can to that  end be understood as performative. It is, inter alia, words 
and actions that stage a gender system, not pre-existing genders or gender identities.28 In that 
way, an illusion of an inner and organised gender core is created. Gender is thus reproduced 
in different discourses. Applied onto the context of the thesis, the point  of departure here is 
that ‘gender’ is constructed. It  is changeable and influenced by social and cultural 
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21 Charli Carpenter, supra n. 17, p. 93.
22 Ibid, p. 80.
23 Ibid.
24  Toril Moi, ‘Vad är en kvinna?  Kön och genus i feministisk teori [What Is a Woman? Sex and Gender in 
Feminist Theory]’, 35(1) Res Publica (1995), pp. 71-158., p. 120f.
25 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 7.
26 Butler is oftentimes quoted. She is also, however, criticised. See Toril Moi, supra n. 24, p. 96ff.
27 Judith Butler, supra n. 25, p. 7.
28 Ibid, p. 33.
preconditions, and not merely a foregone conclusion. Employing such an approach to gender 
helps describe how the construction of a gender group, which may potentially  be target to 
‘gendercide’, is an outcome of social beliefs.
Some authors have also used the term ‘gendercide’ to describe sex-selective abortions. To 
that end, they  label the aborted foetuses as victims of murder. That is a standpoint  I reject. 
The understanding of abortion in the thesis is that a foetus is not a human life. As such, it can 
not be subject to murder. Nonetheless, as will follow from the below, not all acts of genocide 
involve homicide. It is possible to imagine the abortion of particular foetuses to be ‘imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group’ pursuant to Article II(d) of the 
Genocide Convention, if ‘gender groups’ were protected under Article II.29  The theoretical 
framework elaborated herein, however, leaves such complexities for future research to 
consider. ‘Gendercide’, for the purposes of the thesis, relates to episodes of mass killings and 
the application of the crime of genocide in its archetypical sense.
1.4.3 Normative, Empirical and Constructive Theories
Bearing in mind the above stated starting points, the crime of genocide, and perhaps ICL in 
general, can be studied by virtue of three different theoretical categories; ‘normative’, 
‘empirical’ and ‘constructive’ theory. The various categories ask different questions. Applied 
onto the purpose of the thesis, an empirical focus means that the interest of knowledge is 
directed towards producing a description of the legal practice of genocide law. A normative 
focus means that the interest of knowledge relates to the way  ‘gendercide’ ought to be dealt 
with within the framework of ICL and how that could be justified. Lastly, a constructive focus 
means that the interest of knowledge concerns the explication of potential ramifications 
emanating from the current construction of the crime of genocide.30
It should be stressed that these theoretical categories are analytical constructions. In 
reality, they influence each other and overlap. Bearing in mind the overall purpose of the 
thesis, all three of the categories will be considered. In fact, the thesis comprise three parts, 
each of them reflecting the theories. I have made the decision to draw heavily  from these 
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29 The question in that regard is what one puts in the locution ‘imposing’ – can structural complexities suffice?
30  This section is inspired to a high degree by Lennart Lundquist, Demokratins Väktare [The Guardians of 
Democracy] (Lund: Studentlitteratur,  1998), pp. 27f and Mikael Baaz, The Use of Force and International 
Society (Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, 2017), pp. 50-1.
categories because I believe it to be futile to discuss the ‘legal practice’ of genocide law 
without using it as a backdrop for the discussion of how ‘gendercide’ ought to be dealt with, 
else the research will be too descriptive. Conversely, to be able to engage in such normative 
excursions, empirical questions of ‘how’ must be answered. If not, the research risks being 
misguided. Moreover, in conveying potential ramifications stemming from the current 
construction of the crime of genocide there is need to let normative and empirical aspects 
provide the groundwork.31
1.5 Performing the Research – Methods and Material
1.5.1 The Use of Methods
To achieve the purpose established above, the thesis has had to be composed of an 
amalgamation of methodological perspectives. It is not the result of conformity to any single 
legal method, strictly applied. Rather, the thesis employs a mixture of procedural approaches. 
On a broader note, the thesis draws from post-modernist social constructivism and feminist 
jurisprudence. This is manifested in the view of a legal ontology that perceives legal concepts 
as collective constructs without inherent existence and the emphasis on the importance of 
gender as an analytical concept.32  The quest to investigate the theoretical plausibility  of 
including gender groups as protected under the Genocide Convention will, as stated above, 
draw from Nicola Lacey’s conception of feminist legal theory. That is, to not only assess 
particular provisions from a feminist perspective, but also explain how feminist analysis can 
be used to view the entire system of laws from a general and structural perspective. The need 
for drawing from multiple approaches can be explained by this analytical influence; for 
feminist legal theory, there is no consolidated theory or method,33 although it is common for 
theory  and method to be ‘merged’ into one.34 This rationale is included as a methodological 
14
31  Cf. Lennart Lundquist, Det vetenskpaliga studiet av politk [The Scientific Study of Politics] (Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 1993), p. 85.
32  Cf. Mats Glavå and Ulf Petrusson, ‘Illusionen om rätten! – juristprofessionen och ansvaret för 
rättskonstruktionerna [The Illusion of Law! – The Lawyer’s Profession and the Responsibility for the Legal 
Constructions]’, in Bjarte Askeland Bernt, Jan-Fridthiof Bernt (eds), Erkjennelse og engasjement: minneseminar 
for David Roland Doublet (1954-2000) [Recognition and Engagement: Memorandum of David Roland Doublet 
(1954-2000)] (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2002), pp. 109-151, pp. 109-110 and Nicola Lacey, supra n. 11, p. 2.
33 Åsa Gunnarsson and Eva-Maria Svensson, supra n. 13, p. 27.
34 Ibid, p. 122.
point of departure. Practically, this means that the approach will be to analyse ICL and its 
jurisprudence through a conceptual method of interpretation, where the legal construction of 
the crime of genocide is perceived as a product of a dynamic social process, influenced by 
gender as a concept, and not as a part in a closed system. In that, the approach is closely 
linked to explaining what transpires beneath the surface of the application of Article II of the 
Genocide Convention, and thereby, the purpose of the thesis.
The method used in Chapter 3 deviates, to some extent, from such a conceptual method of 
interpretation. Instead, it  takes its point of departure from an interpretation and 
systematisation of material that is traditionally given the status as ‘legal’ sources. The end 
result seeks to highlight how certain provisions can be understood in a certain context. 
Practically, my choice of method here means that I use Article II of the Genocide Convention 
as a starting point and through this draw necessary  conclusions to answer the first  research 
question. Initially, it  is therefore a de lege lata line of reasoning at hand. At the beginning, the 
answer to the research question is of descriptive character. The results emanate, however, into 
analytical problematisation. Thereby, I go beyond merely stating ‘applicable law’. Upon 
using ‘legal’ sources, I employ both the classification and hierarchy in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with the addition of jus cogens norms and 
resolutions from the UN Security Council (UNSC). The hierarchy is, to clarify, as follows
- jus cogens norms;
- UNSC Resolutions;
- international conventions;
- international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
- the general principles of law, recognised by civilised nations;
- judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly  qualified publicists, as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
When legal sources call for interpretation, I employ mainly  a teleological interpretation, 
seeing the object and purpose behind the legal source. Jurisprudence from the International 
Criminal Tribunals and the ICJ is included for the same reason.
The topic of the thesis moreover requires analogous interpretations of domestic law. It 
should be noted that there is no overall comparative perspective throughout the thesis. Rather, 
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the thesis include comparative aspects, in the form of using a micro-comparative point of 
view. That is, comparing different legal systems on a provisional level.35
The research finds additional support in trans-disciplinary reasoning. While the research 
has a rather firm ‘legal’ foundation, in the sense that it  encircles the legal construction of the 
crime of genocide, it does not work solely  within this distinctive field of inquiry. Rather, I 
seek to create a unity of intellectual frameworks beyond disciplinary perspectives.36  This 
becomes particularly evident in Chapters 2 and 4. In Chapter 2, a ‘legal’ perspective is 
supplemented with a historical ditto. Practically, this means that I turn to ‘historical’ sources, 
allowing us to produce a historical narrative. Thereby, we can make interpretations relating to 
the historical interests that permeate the Genocide Convention. In Chapter 4, a sociological 
approach is interlaced with a ‘legal’ one, in order to draw a more nuanced picture of the 
ontology  of a ‘group’. When doing so, I also employ  the interpretative canon of ejusdem 
generis. This method of interpretation is employed to interpret general terms (i.e ‘protected 
groups’), using the specific terms (i.e national, ethnical, racial or religious groups) 
surrounding the general term as context, to ascertain whether a certain class (i.e gender 
groups) is of the same kind to the specific terms.37
On that account, the overall method used herein could be characterised as exploratory, as 
the work explores the interconnectivity  between ‘gendercide’ and genocide from a 
perspective which has hitherto seldom been addressed. It  does not attempt to offer finite and 
conclusive solutions in this regard, but rather to provide theoretical insights. Still, the 
approaches in the thesis set out to fulfil a research aim decided a priori. Consequently, the use 
of theories, methods and materials have been limited to such that can be expected to provide 
successful results in that regard. As such, a critical reader may question the objectivity of the 
research, or whether the following research is jurisprudential to begin with. Hence, a few 
remarks are in order.
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37  Cf.  Nicholas R. Bednar and Margaret Penland, ‘Asylum’s Interpretative Impasse’, 26(1) Minn. J. Int'l L. 
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1.5.2 Regarding Objectivity
Concerning the epistemological question of objectivity, the chosen approaches testify my 
context of discovery. That is, the part of the scientific process where the scientific problems 
are identified, hypotheses are formulated and terms are defined. Upon seeking ‘objectivity’ in 
this context, I find that there is reason to discard the appearance of distance between the 
science subject and the science object, and to acknowledge a form of embodied objectivity.38 
That is because, bearing the social constructivist basis of the thesis in mind, no jurisprudence 
exist in a material sense. The same applies to legal methods. As such, these constructions can 
not be either ‘true’ or ‘false’, since it  is humans, without interpretative prerogatives, who 
operate them. As long as the knowledge is situated, it is possible to align a pre-set aim and 
method with ‘objectivity’. In that sense, I view how the scientific research is to be carried out, 
and the ‘knowledge process’ in the same way as Donna Haraway:
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and 
not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims. These are claims on 
people’s lives; the view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured body, 
versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity.39
1.5.3 Is the Thesis to Be Considered Jurisprudential?
As noted above, the thesis is to be characterised as trans-disciplinary. The more important 
question in the context of a Master’s thesis for the law programme is, however, what renders 
it jurisprudential? The inquiry is relevant to ponder, bearing the tension between ‘legal 
scholarship’ and ‘legal practice’ in mind. From the perspective of the latter, which perceives 
legal research as seeking knowledge in law, it  could be argued that what I attempt to do here 
is not legal research at  all. From the perspective of the former, however, which advocates an 
understanding of legal research as seeking knowledge about law, the thesis is decidedly 
qualified as jurisprudence. I shall clarify how directly below.
First of all, the thesis takes its point of departure from a ‘legal’ vocabulary and sets out to 
expose ‘beliefs’ in the legal system. Thus, its focal point is undoubtedly ‘law’. Second, 
relying on history and sociology is nothing but an inevitable consequence of the study object; 
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the crime of genocide is not  limited to a legal world of understanding. In effect, trying to 
solely  use a ‘legal’ point of departure – whatever that may be – would not be viable at all in 
this context, as the investigation needs to be anchored in a form of external analysis. Even the 
most puritan approach to ‘law’ ought to view it as a ‘normatively closed but cognitively 
open’ system, meaning that ‘law’ must not be viewed in isolation from other sciences.40 
Hence, the thesis is to be characterised as jurisprudential.
1.5.4 Possible Restraints of the Method
Bearing the purpose, delimitations and chosen methods in mind, the thesis sets out to deal 
with ‘real world’ problems. While my research can be said to be performed on a system level, 
it should be noted that I have no first-hand experience of the issues I approach. I have no 
means to pursue, for example, a multisited ethnography. Therefore, I will have to rely  solely 
on second-hand sources. Essentially, this research will be written by a person sitting in a 
library, reading what  other people sitting in libraries have written. In consequence, my 
experiences of ‘gendercides’ are solely based on accounts from other people. While there is 
field research carried out by various non-governmental organisations in India on the ‘Indian 
gendercide’, the general mapping of the issue is, at best, sparse and could be considered a 
‘gap’ in the method. As such, in Section 7.2, when making suggestions for further research, I 
advocate a methodical shift, calling for the use of multisited ethnography.
1.5.5 Materials and Sources Used
Spanning across several scientific fields and having quite a broad ambit, a wide array of 
materials and sources, that represent ‘reality’, have been used. As noted above, codified 
international law (especially, but not limited to the Genocide Convention, with specific focus 
on its Article II and other UN Documents, inter alia resolutions from the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA)) and jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals are at 
centre. Concerning the latter aspect, primarily  case law from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is used. These materials are included to sketch a broader canvas for the 
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thesis and to provide arguments. In juxtaposition to the aforementioned sources, comments to 
and analyses of such materials, primarily from works produced by scholars of ICL, are 
included for the same reasons. In that regard, the two monographs Genocide and Political 
Groups by  David L. Nersessian41 and Genocide in International Law by William A. Schabas42 
have been of prime importance in providing valuable information and arguments, but also for 
reference work. Concerning the ‘historical’ segment, I turn to the travaux préparatoires. 
Thereby, records from the drafting process are included as material. I have also made use of 
various feminist literature (that is, literature informed by the politics of feminism) to be able 
to produce and employ theoretical points of departure that rightly  can be conceptualised as 
feminist jurisprudence. These materials are primarily used when defining how feminist legal 
theory  has inspired the thesis and when chiseling the ‘gendercide’ framework out. Reports 
from the UN as well as various non-governmental organisations are also included, in 
particular when discussing the ‘Indian gendercide’ in Section 6.2.1. Moreover, I use domestic 
legislation of three contracting parties concerning the personal scope of the crime of genocide 
in order to produce a micro-comparative investigation.43
As an attempt to ensure that the material used is reliable, articles published in academic 
journals and monographs published by renowned authors or publishers is preferred. When 
searching material for Section 6.2.1, upon discussing the ‘Indian gendercide’, it has proven 
hard to find a large variation of sources. Nonetheless, in those circumstances, I limit  the use 
of materials to reports from established non-governmental organisations. In that regard, I 
consider the reputation of the provider of the sources in order to determine the tenability of 
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43 It should be noted that, to gather material, I have primarily used various databases. One that in particular has 
proven fruitful for the purposes of the thesis is HeinOnline (to visit the database, please go to https://
home.heinonline.org/). I have used the following search parameters: ‘gender + genocide’, ‘gendercide’ and ‘the 
protected groups in the genocide convention + gender’. In order to obtain judgments from the International 
Criminal Tribunals concerning the protected groups, I have used the UN’s Case Law Database (to visit the 
database, please go to http://cld.unmict.org/). When searching, I used the parameters ‘genocide’, ‘protected 
groups’ and ‘Article II’. This has, of course, resulted in a profusion of material. Therefore, a seriatim criteria has 
been employed in order to decide which material is going to be used, meaning that the material was assessed on 
the basis on how well it intersected with the purpose of my thesis. Material was, moreover, frequently collected 
through references of other scholars, in particular from the two monographs referred to above.
the sources. I also test the trustworthiness of the sources by  confirming the information 
against the backdrop of news-media searches.
1.6 Positioning to Existing Research
There has been ample research regarding the protected groups pursuant to Article II of the 
Genocide Convention. Over the recent years, post-modern approaches, similar to what I seek 
to do, have been of increasing prevalence. Thereby, the thesis is not the first  to be critical to 
the current construction of the protected groups. While the value and importance of previous 
assertions should not be understated, the thesis will position itself quite differently. It draws 
from feminist legal theory and employs a theoretical framework of ‘gendercide’, inspired by 
Butler’s gender theory. I believe these are important aspects that have been overlooked in the 
academic field of genocide studies. These perspectives introduce a conceptual frame that can 
contribute to the understanding of gender in the nexus to genocide. Additionally, they aid in 
exposing values, notions and norms expressed by the genocide law system.
The most notable divergence from existing research is the ambit of the thesis. The cookie-
cutter approach for insertions being ‘critical’ to the protected groups of the Genocide 
Convention is to suggest that  certain groups should be added, because they are similar to 
those currently protected. That is not what is attempted here. My hope with the thesis is to 
make a meaningful contribution concerning the application of the concept of genocide to 
gender groups. Thereby, my work seeks to rethink the terms of the debate to whether an 
inclusion of gender groups is theoretically plausible. The notion is to call attention to the 
underlying world of beliefs that controls the current construction of the protected groups, how 
this relates to gender groups, and to critique this implicit system on a theoretical level. Not to 
emanate into a policy proposal.
1.7 Disposition – How the Purpose has Formed the Method and Structure
As alluded to above, at the heart of the analysis lies the elucidation of certain ‘hidden’ beliefs 
that allows for hegemonic interpretations. To achieve such an explication, I have had the 
thesis comprise three parts, with associating chapters.
Part I deals with the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 2 probes the historical 
underpinnings of the concept of genocide and its evolution from academic theory to a 
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substantive international crime. It provides a brief overflight of the etymology of the term and 
the legacy of Raphael Lemkin. It engages in a discussion of the decision to limit the scope of 
protection of the Genocide Convention to certain typologies through a diplomatic lens, 
drawing from the travaux préparatoires. In due order, Chapter 3 details the actus reus and 
mens rea for the crime of genocide. Here, special attention is paid to the intricacies in 
ascertaining the contours of the protected groups.
Part II addresses the normative part of the thesis. Chapter 4 discusses the concept of 
human ‘groups’ and the inherent difficulties in constructing typologies for legal and social 
purposes. It moreover addresses the connection between ICL and a broader understanding of 
human groups as social collectives. Against this background, it  advocates an understanding of 
the Genocide Convention as a rights-implementing institute. This opens for a subsequent 
ejusdem generis-analysis, demonstrating that gender collectives have many similar 
characteristics to the four enumerated groups in Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
Following, Chapter 5 probes the linkage between the crime of genocide and other instruments 
in international law, with specific focus on crimes against humanity. It employs a comparative 
analysis between these instruments and ponders whether they are sufficient proxies for 
‘gendercides’. The chapter assesses if the availability  of such constructions is an adequate 
justification not to include other groups, such as gender groups, than the ones enumerated in 
the Convention. Chapter 6 closes off the normative part of the thesis with a discussion of 
‘gendercide’ seen in the penumbra of the theoretical justifications for international 
criminalisation, and the overarching aims of the international criminal justice system.
Part III actualises the constructive part of the thesis. To conclude the thesis, Chapter 7 
delves deeper into the possible ramifications of the current construction of the protected 
groups. It offers critique of the omission to protect gender groups, ultimately resolving 
whether an inclusion of gender groups as protected under the Genocide Convention is 
theoretically plausible. In view of that, I offer some brief suggestions for further research, 
justified by the study I have conducted. As a finale, in Chapter 8, a completion follow, 
stressing some final thoughts and reflections.
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Part I: Empirical Theory
2 The Historical Origins of the Concept of Genocide
In order to understand contemporary issues relating to genocide, it is necessary to trace back 
the history of its conceptual underpinnings. In the following chapter, I probe the origins of the 
crime of genocide in order to describe its evolution from academic concept to substantive 
crime under ICL. In what follows below, special attention is paid to the blurring of conceptual 
borders. In making these tensions discernible, I seek to highlight and contextualise challenges 
that might emanate from an effort to address ‘gendercides’.
2.1 The Legacy of Raphael Lemkin
During the Second World War, the Polish scholar Raphael Lemkin coined the term 
‘genocide’ in his treatise Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, published in 1944. The book detailed 
the Axis Powers’ practices of extermination in the Holocaust. To label these practices, 
Lemkin constructed the concept of genocide. Although ‘the fact of genocide is as old as 
humanity’,44 the term was a ‘modern word for an old crime’.45 The complete eradication of 
Carthage by Rome in 146 BC and the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during 
and after the First World War are two examples of the extensive history of the ‘fact’ of 
genocide.46
Etymologically, the neologism is a hybrid combining the Greek genos (race, tribe or 
nation) and the Latin cide (killing).47 Prima facie, a verbatim interpretation appears to confine 
the ambit of the concept to circumstances involving races, tribes or nations. Indeed, in Axis 
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Rule, Lemkin speaks of genocide as something directed against national minorities.48 
Lemkin’s conceptualisation of genocide was, however, broader. Notably, he emphasised that 
‘[i]f the destruction of human groups is a problem of international concern, then such acts 
should be treated as crimes under the law of nations’.49 In this regard, the concept of genocide 
was likely  conceived in a similar vein as an earlier proposal Lemkin made in 1933. Then, he 
proposed the crime of ‘barbarity’, which covered acts of extermination perpetrated ‘out of 
hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivty [sic]’.50  Following this logic, it is 
palpable that Lemkin did not anticipate the concept of genocide to be limited to a select 
number of groups. Rather, the object and purpose from his point of view was likely to 
construct a locution for ‘actions subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple 
permanently a human group. The acts are directed against groups, as such, and individuals 
selected for destruction only because they belong to these groups’.51 Such a perspective opens 
up for an inclusion of different types of human groups. Thereby, gender groups can be said to 
be in coherence with the spirit of the concept of genocide as it first was imagined by Lemkin.
The concept of genocide was rapidly  incorporated into legal nomenclature after the 
Second World War. To counteract impunity of Nazi crimes,52  the Allied forces held an 
International Military  Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg. The IMT was granted jurisdiction over 
three separate crimes; crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.53 
Consequently, since it was not a part of the IMT Charter, the locution ‘genocide’ did not 
appear in the judgments. It was, however, used in the indictments as well as the prosecutors’ 
closing arguments as an explanatory term.54  Even though none of the defendants were 
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convicted of genocide in the Nuremberg trials, the judgments did explain acts that today 
would be defined as genocide. Thus, the early  use of the concept of genocide, as Nersessian 
puts it, set ‘the stage for the evolution of genocide into a separate criminal offence’.55
After the Nuremberg trials ended, lower-ranking Nazi officials were tried by  a US 
military tribunal that operated pursuant to Control Council No. 10 (CC10).56  In their 
jurisprudence, genocide started to materialise as a term with legal substance. In the so-called 
Justice case,57 officials of the Reich Ministry  of Justice, judges and prosecutors were tried. 
The case encircled the Nacht und Nebel program, under which civilians of occupied 
territories, charged with a type of (minor) offence were either executed or secretly  removed to 
Germany.58 The Tribunal in the Justice case found the defendants ‘accessory  to and took a 
consenting part  in the crime of genocide’.59 Genocide, the Tribunal argued, was ‘the prime 
illustration of a crime against humanity’.60 Consequently, the Tribunal constructed genocide 
as a subcategory of the broader notion of crimes against humanity. The genocide convictions 
pursuant to CC10 therefore highlight the transformation of the locution ‘genocide’ from an 
explanatory  concept, to a part of legal terminology in the IMT proceedings, and then to a type 
of crime against humanity.
2.2 Genocide From a Political-Diplomatic Perspective
The end of the Second World War created the will to prevent horrendous acts like the 
Holocaust from repeating, which in turn provided the momentum for the international society 
to make considerable efforts to unify. This post-war momentum led to the establishment of 
the UN. Various lobby efforts to adopt an international legal instrument devoted to genocide 
ensued.61 The UNGA was the first  organ to actualise the matter within the new international 
order, and on the 11th of December 1946, it unanimously passed Resolution 96(1). The 
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Resolution defined the crime of genocide as ‘the denial of the right of existence of entire 
human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings’.62 
Notably, the Resolution proceeds to ascertain that ‘genocide is a crime under international 
law […] whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds’.63 
Matthew Lippman labels this a ‘liberal conceptualisation’,64  with the philosophical 
underpinning that the use of violence to exterminate groups of human beings, on the sole 
basis of their affinity to a particular group, is despicable. Such a construction opens for a 
broad conception of genocide. Resolution 96(1) thus stays in line with Lemkin’s original 
object and purpose. In turn, as a matter of history, the core of the resolution could be extended 
to encompass gender collectives, apart from the currently  enumerated ones. It should, 
however, be borne in mind that General Assembly  Resolutions are not sources of binding 
law.65 That is probably for the best, seeing as such an open-ended list could be conflicting 
with the nullum crimen sine lege principle. Nonetheless, since the Resolution was adopted 
unanimously and without debate, coupled with the explicit reference in the Genocide 
Convention’s preamble, renders it  important as a matter of opinio juris.66  It has even been 
argued that, by  virtue of the phrasing in Resolution 96(1), other groups can be considered 
protected by a jus cogens norm which prohibits genocide.67
Resolution 96(1) requested the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
to prepare a draft convention on the crime of genocide,68  which in turn instructed the 
Secretary-General to perform the same task.69  The Secretariat’s Draft was written by the 
Secretariat’s Human Rights Division, assisted by – inter alia – Lemkin himself. The 
Secretary-General set out to draft a treaty that would, as far as possible, ‘embrace all points 
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likely to be adopted, leaving it to the competent organs of the United Nations to eliminate 
what they did not wish to include.’70 The protected groups under the draft convention covered 
national, linguistic, racial, religious and political collectives of human beings.71  Thus, the 
draft convention discarded the residual reference to ‘any other groups’. However, the 
Secretary-General noted that the list of protected groups was to be considered ‘not 
exhaustive’.72  The Secretariat’s Draft thereby gives sufficient leeway  in imagining gender 
collectives as coherent with the other groupings. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General 
anticipated that which groups to protect  will be ‘the first general question which will have to 
be settled’,73 thereby identifying the crux of which groups to include as a political dilemma.
In order to deal with these political issues, an Ad Hoc Committee was created.74 Notably, 
the Committee considered it ‘essentially within the competence of governments’ to answer 
the question of ‘[w]hat  human groups should be protected? Should all human groups, whether 
racial, national, linguistic, religious or political, be protected or only  some of them?’75 
Consequently, debates on the ratio for protecting groups ensued. The Soviet Union delegate 
considered that genocide was ‘organically  bound up  with Fascism-Nazism and other similar 
race “theories” [...]’.76 The Polish delegate argued for the exclusion of political groups ‘since 
they  lacked the necessary  homogeneity  and stability’.77  The Lebanese delegate’s opinion 
juxtaposed that of the Polish delegate, arguing that political groups are ‘based on a body of 
theoretical concepts whereas sentiment or tradition bound the members of a national, racial or 
religious group’.78 Consequently, the delegate argued, political groups are unfit for protection. 
On the other hand, France and China supported broader conceptualisations of the protected 
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groups, with France seeking to add groups of ‘opinion’ to the enumerated groups.79 Moreover, 
according to Lippman, ‘some [delegates] suggested expanding Article III to encompass social 
and political groups’.80 Eventually, the Ad Hoc Committee settled for the same category  of 
protected groups as in the Secretariat’s draft. The question of whether the enumerated groups 
were to be considered exhaustive or not was, however, a matter left undiscussed.
The UN’s Sixth Committee drafted the final text of the Genocide Convention. Many of 
the points raised in the Ad Hoc Committee relating to the political nature of what groups to 
include re-emerged. Inter alia, the Soviet Union delegate reiterated its previous standpoint.81 
The Committee likely felt  it was urgent to complete the Convention swiftly, ‘before the 
memory of the barbarous crimes which had been committed faded from the minds of men’.82 
It was likely  against this background that the Iranian delegate suggested ‘adopting a 
convention embodying all the points on which agreement was possible’, leaving the more 
cumbersome problems for an ‘additional convention [to] settle’.83  This outlook led to an 
overhaul of Articles II and III. Political groups were discarded from the enumerated groups; 
ethnic groups were added.84 The concept of cultural genocide as a modus operandi was also 
scrapped.85  The draft convention by  the Sixth Committee was subsequently unanimously 
adopted on the 9th of December 1948 by the UNGA – the same construction applies today.86
2.3 Concluding Remarks
It is necessary  to comprehend the deliberations over which groups to protect in a broader 
context. At its inception, the spirit of the concept of genocide, illustrated by  Lemkin’s own 
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writings and the UNGA Resolution 96(1), was imagined to be applied on a wider scale. 
During the drafting process the concept became distorted, limiting both the personal scope as 
well as the modi operandi. Consequently, as it  is constructed today, the scope of protection 
from genocide under ICL is limited to protected groups, instead of ‘actions subordinated to 
the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently a human group’.87  Thus, there is an 
evident disparity between genocide as Lemkin imagined it and the legal construction of 
genocide – the latter being considerably more restrictive. Some scholars even question 
whether the drafters were aware of themselves making decisions of a legislative character, 
rather than a political ditto.88 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn opines in this regard that ‘the 
wording of the Convention is so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed 
since its adoption is covered by it’.89 Consequently, ‘the Convention’s list of protected groups 
has probably provoked more debate since 1948 than any other aspect of the instrument’.90
I contend that the decision to limit the scope of the Genocide Convention to the 
enumerated groups appears to be a choice emanating from political compromise, rather than a 
conceptual conclusion that other groups, among them gender collectives, were unfit for 
protection. Indeed, the Secretary-General directly framed the question of which groups to 
include as such. That label seems representative for the entire drafting process. Drawing from 
a feminist legal theory  perspective, the process can be characterised as a matrix, in which 
certain political positions express hegemonic interests. In the drafting process, there was a 
silence concerning gender. The silence speaks, in the sense that gender, as a concept, enters 
into focus in a very limited way in the context of genocide. To this day, the same ‘choices’ 
made during the political deliberations permeate the legal construction that is the crime of 
genocide. This begs the question, what does it take for an act  to be constructed as genocide 
and what is the legal locus for the explicitly protected groups pursuant to Article II of the 
Genocide Convention? The next chapter will deal with this issue.
28
87 Raphael Lemkin, supra n. 49, p. 147.
88 David L. Nersessian, supra n. 41, p. 108.
89 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (eds), supra n. 46, p. 11. 
90 William A. Schabas, supra n. 42, p. 117.
3 The Legal Canvas – the Crime of Genocide
The following chapter deals with the two fundamental elements of the crime of genocide; the 
actus reus and mens rea. Since genocide is a criminal offence, and bearing in mind that the 
thesis concerns genocide law, a framework bearing close semblance to domestic criminal law 
has been employed. Within a context of domestic criminal law, the criminal elements are 
essential since they establish the set  of facts that must be proven for a crime to actualise.91 
Criminal offences in the context of ICL adhere to the same rationale. ICL analysis of an 
offence thus departs from a division between the ‘objective’ element (the actus reus) and the 
‘subjective’ element (the mens rea). The former relates to the specific material facts and the 
latter to the accused’s criminal intent. The chapeau of Article II of the Genocide Convention 
references to the mens rea of genocide, the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’. The five subsequent subparagraphs detail the 
criminal conduct.92 The aim with the chapter is to set the frame for the subsequent analysis of 
the application of the concept of genocide to gender groups, and to anchor later normative 
considerations to a specific context.
3.1 Actus Reus
In the following section, I seek to probe the ‘objective’ element of the crime of genocide. 
First, I set out to provide a brief exposé of the prohibited acts that can constitute genocide. 
Subsequently, I intend to sketch the contours of the four enumerated groups in Article II of 
the Genocide Convention, and how they have been dealt with in the International Criminal 
Tribunals’ jurisprudence. Against this background, I venture deeper into the difficulties in 
determining group membership.
3.1.1 The Prohibited Acts
After the chapeau, Article II enumerates five modi operandi of genocide:
(a) Killing members of the group;
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(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The list  is exhaustive, and only the specified acts are prohibited.93 Article II is thus narrowly 
circumscribed, and only criminalises physical and biological genocide.94  In contrast to the 
colloquial understanding of genocide, a génocidaire does not need to be successful in 
exterminating the protected group entirely. The point of completion for the crime of genocide 
is as soon as any of the enumerated acts is committed against a group member with the 
overall intent to destroy the group.95 There is no threshold in terms of multitude in victims.96 
In that sense, the crime of genocide can be an inchoate offence against the protected groups.97
3.1.2 The Protected Groups
Not all human groups are protected by the Genocide Convention. The crime can only, per 
definition, be committed against members of national, ethnic, racial or religious collectives.98 
Thereby, departing from a formalist interpretation of the provision, it  is clear that the crime of 
genocide can not be committed towards gender groups. The victims must moreover be chosen 
on the basis of their membership of such a collective, with the overarching intent to destroy 
the group ‘in whole or in part’. They  are in this respect a ‘means to an end’.99 Therefore, the 
group requirement is undoubtedly fundamental for the crime of genocide. To ‘anchor’ later 
analytical inquiries, the following section seeks to explicate of how a group is to be 
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constructed to fit within the scheme of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group for the 
purposes of the Article II.
3.1.2.1 National, Ethnical, Racial and Religious Groups
Seeing as these four groups are the sole beneficiaries of the protection granted by the 
Genocide Convention, it is regrettable that there is no recognised definition for any  of them in 
the Convention or elsewhere.100 It is near impossible to attribute a distinct ontology  to them, 
as they intersect and overlap significantly. The ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu101 largely set 
out to construct objective definitions for each of the four groups enumerated in Article II. In 
order to ascertain whether a group fell within the ambit of the Convention, the ICTR required 
an ‘objective evaluation’ of the group to see if it fit the scheme of the definitions they posed.
The concept of a national group was contended to be ‘a collection of people who are 
perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of 
rights and duties.’102 The ICTR tied its definition to the rationale put forth in the Nottebohm 
decision by the ICJ.103  Nottebohm, however, concerned the issue of nationality. By making 
this reference, the tribunal seemingly juxtaposed citizenship  with belonging to a national 
group.104 Thereby, group members’ individual perceptions of nationality are irrelevant. The 
ICTR definition puts emphasis on the legal characteristics of nationality  – ‘a shared legal 
bond’ and ‘rights and duties’. The rationale is closely  associated with the nation state, and hits 
far from the way  Lemkin imagined the concept of nationality.105  Lemkin opined that the 
notion of a national group ‘signifies constructive cooperation and original contributions, 
based upon genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national psychology’.106 
Thus, a wider concept than citizenship.
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In fact, by  consolidating ‘traditions and genuine culture’, Lemkin’s idea had closer 
semblance to the way the tribunal conceptualised ethnical groups. In the same judgment, the 
Trial Chamber constructed ethnic groups as ‘generally defined as a group whose members 
share a common language or culture’.107  It ascertained that the Rwandan Tutsi were an 
ethnical group, even though they did share the same language and culture as the Hutu who 
massacred them. The distinction was made possible by virtue of constructing the ‘stable and 
permanent’ criterion, which will be further discussed in Section 4.2.1. In a broader, sociology 
discourse, Anthony D. Smith defines ethnical groups as a ‘named human population with 
shared ancestry myths, history and cultures, having an association with a specific territory’.108 
Therefore, ethnicity  seems to be a tangible notion and a fluid form of identity, connected to a 
plethora of contextual elements. It can virtually cover all forms of human interaction.
The ICTR moreover opined that a racial group is a group  based on ‘the hereditary 
physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, 
national or religious factors’.109 The definition is, to say the least, problematic. The reference 
to ‘hereditary  physical characteristics’ suggests that  it is possible to discern biological 
differences between human ‘races’. This has, however, long been discarded as fiction,110 
rendering the definition insufficient. Additionally, making such a reference is not only 
scientifically inaccurate, but  also conserves cumbersome and outdated ways of dividing 
people into separate races within the human species. As such, it may incite, or in any  way 
approve of, racist considerations. From a different perspective, the definition also turns a 
blind eye to the wider social and historical context of certain groups, oversimplifying them to 
mere ‘races’.111 However, it becomes evident that the discourses relating to ‘races’ in the time 
of the drafting was somewhat different than what it  is today; it was considered unproblematic 
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in that temporal context. Lemkin, a child of his time, divided the European people into 
different classes.112  Of course, it was a similar rationale that influenced the Holocaust. 
However, with developments within the field of contemporary  biology, it is ascertained that 
no such biological differences exist.113
The definition of a religious group is, according to the ICTR, ‘one whose members share 
the same religion, denomination or mode of worship’.114 It has also been argued by some 
scholars that ‘religion is probably  the least controversial standard [in the Genocide 
Convention]’.115 The locus of religious groups should be interpreted in a lenient manner, in 
order to have a broad scope. It has been argued that essentially every ‘community united by  a 
single spiritual ideal’ should be covered.116 Thus, it is likely  that non-theistic groups also are 
encompassed – seeing as they share a mode of worship  (abstaining from religious rites) and a 
similar belief system (that there is no deity).
3.1.3 Determining Group Membership
The ‘objective’ approach to the protected groups offered by  the ICTR in Akayesu risks 
missing the wood for the trees. Consequently, there was later a gradual shift in the 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals. Later judgments employ a leaning 
towards subjective parameters. The objective approach was discarded in Jelisić, noting that
[t]o attempt to define a national, ethnical, racial or religious group today using objective and 
scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not necessarily 
correspond to the perception of the persons concerned by such categorisation.117
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The subjective approach steers clear of objective, ‘scientific’ elements. Rather, the subjective 
approach makes reference to the perpetrator’s point of view of the victim group.118  If the 
génocidaire defines the victim group as one of the protected groups of genocide, the victim 
group is such a group. The perpetrator’s perspective thereby becomes ‘the defining element 
for the crime of genocide’.119 It is, however, hard to reconcile this rationale with principles of 
legality. Foreseeability and specificity of criminal conduct are paramount parameters of the 
principle of legality, and it is difficult to imagine the subjective approach fulfilling such 
requirements. Every génocidaire will differ in mindset and will have a different perspective 
of their victims. As such, a uniform measurement of victim groups will be absent. Employing 
a subjective approach is, however, coherent with the sociological processes leading up to a 
genocide. Inherent in every act of genocide is the génocidaire’s prejudice against ‘the Other’ 
group. The génocidaire identifies, distinguishes between and stigmatises the out-group.120 
Subsequently, they seek to exterminate it. Within a context of sociology, the stigmatisation of 
other groups is commonly referred to as ‘othering’.121 To some extent, through leaning on 
subjective parameters, this process is transplanted into the context of genocide law. The 
criticism directed against the subjective approach above, however, appear quite serious. There 
is reason, I believe, to be weary  of such drawbacks. At the same time, there is reason to 
underline that  through the subjective perspective, the characteristics of the group can be 
identified in the penumbra of its socio-historic context, given that such stigmatisation can not 
arise from a structural vacuum.
3.2 Mens Rea
The following section attempts to deal with the ‘subjective’ element of the crime of genocide 
(the mens rea). It investigates the crime of genocide’s dolus specialis and considers the notion 
of discriminatory  intent against the protected groups. It also actualises the difficulties in 
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ascertaining a perpetrator’s intent to destroy  a group ‘in part or in whole’, and examines how 
such intent can be qualified, departing from the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
developed in the International Criminal Tribunal’s jurisprudence.
3.2.1 ‘Committed With Intent’
For the crime of genocide to be committed, the perpetrator must act intentionally. The mens 
rea comprises both the intention to commit the underlying prohibited act as well as the dolus 
specialis.122 The dolus specialis requirement means that  genocide is committed only ‘when 
the intent is to eradicate the individuals for no other reason than that they  are a member of the 
specified group’.123 The dolus specialis is the crime of genocide’s ‘specialty and distinguishes 
it from an ordinary crime and other crimes against international humanitarian law’.124 Against 
the historical backdrop  of the Holocaust, discerning such intent may not  have been difficult. 
In other potential cases of genocide, however, the task is seldom as straightforward. 
Accordingly, the International Criminal Tribunals have needed to elaborate the contours of 
the mens rea requirement. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that the dolus specialis 
requirement means that, for the perpetrator to be culpable ‘the act must have been committed 
against one or several individuals, because such individual or individuals were members of a 
specific group, and specifically because they belonged to this group’.125 Genocide is thus a 
crime against collectives – the mens rea must encompass the protected group. To that end, it 
is required that the intent is to destroy the group per se, as opposed individuals in their own 
right.126 Ergo, a form of discriminatory intent.
The International Criminal Tribunals have elaborated more explicitly what is required to 
discern the discriminatory intent of a génocidaire. In their jurisprudence, it follows that it is 
not required for the génocidaire to have a ‘specific plan to destroy’127 the group to which the 
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genocidal acts are directed towards. Rather, intent can be implicitly determined from the 
methodical, wide-ranging and systematic manner in which the acts are committed.128  The 
rationale is reflected in the International Criminal Court’s Element of Crimes. Here, it  follows 
that intent is at hand when the perpetrator’s ‘conduct took place in the context of a manifest 
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group’.129
3.2.2 ‘In Whole or in Part’ – the Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches
Apart from the discriminatory character, the intention behind the acts must be to destroy, in 
whole or in part, the group ‘as such’, meaning ‘as a separate and distinct entity’.130 In spite of 
the fact  that ‘[i]t is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group 
from every corner of the globe’,131 the phraseology of Article II begs the precarious question 
of where the ‘group’ ends, where a ‘part’ of it starts and where it ceases to be entirely.
In the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals, the question has been 
rephrased to how many people constitute a ‘part’ of a group. Case law recognises two 
possible qualifications in answering that question; the quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative approach focuses on the amount of the people killed, rendering the group 
members per se fungible. In Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR held that this inquiry 
requires ‘a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group’ to be 
exterminated.132  Taking a somewhat modified stance, the ICTY argued that it requires a 
‘substantial’ number and that the targeted portion must be ‘significant enough […] to have an 
impact on the group as a whole’.133 In Krstić, it was sufficient with approximately 7 000 out 
of 30 000 victims of Muslim Bosnians for the criterion ‘in part’ to be considered fulfilled. The 
point of view of the ICTY in this regard is reflected by the ICJ, which has noted that ‘when 
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part of the group  is targeted, that part  must be significant enough for its destruction to have an 
impact on the group as a whole’.134
The qualitative approach, adopted in Jelisić,135 takes a different point  of departure, as it 
explicitly denotes that not all group members are equal. Here, the accused must intend to 
destroy ‘either a major part of the group or a representative fraction thereof, such as its 
leaders’.136  To that end, it suffices that persons in emblematic positions, such as political 
leaders, religious leaders, intellectuals and so forth, necessary for the survival of the group in 
question is victimised. Concerning gender groups, Kriangsak Kittichaisaree has argued in this 
regard that  ‘the destruction of all or almost all young, fertile women of child bearing age who 
account for only 5-10 per cent of the entire population of the protected group is genocide’.137 
Notwithstanding this, the extent of the acts committed against the victim group still bears 
relevance. From one perspective, the ICJ has noted that  ‘the qualitative approach can not 
stand alone’.138  Moreover, figuring out the perpetrator’s intent will be more difficult since 
‘[w]here genocide involves the destruction of a large number of members of a group, the 
logical deduction will be more obvious. If there are only a few victims, the deduction will be 
far less evident’.139
3.3 Concluding Remarks
The above explicates that the notion of a ‘group’ is an essential part of the crime of genocide. 
After having done the empirical analysis of the legal practice of genocide law, we can now 
turn the searchlight to the normative level and start  discussing how ‘gendercide’ ought  to be 
dealt with within the framework of ICL and how that could be justified. In order to do so, the 
next chapter begins with a probing of the ontology of human groups – what are they to begin 
with, and why do we want to protect them through law?
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Part II: Normative Theory
4 Protecting Human Groups in ICL
In the following chapter, I seek to investigate whether similar treatment can be motivated for 
gender groups as for the enumerated groups in Article II of the Genocide Convention. I do so 
by first probing the ontology of human groups and the complexities in transforming them for 
legal objectives. Subsequently, I outline how the restrictive scope of the Convention has 
spurred extravagant interpretations of the treaty  text and the travaux préparatoires in order to 
make amends to a shifting ‘everyday reality’. Against this background, I examine why not all 
human groups ought to be protected in the Genocide Convention and consider why political 
groups were excluded from the personal scope of the Convention to e contrario determine the 
justifications for including certain human groups. Thereafter, I suggest to view the crime of 
genocide as an instrument that ascertains paramount individual rights with intimate collective 
characteristics. In view hereof, I employ an ejusdem generis analysis to probe whether gender 
groups are of a similar kind to the enumerated collectives in Article II, so that they, when 
targeted as such, could be afforded protection from physical and biological destruction.
4.1 The Ontology of Human Groups and Their Significance ‘As Such’
The question of what constitutes a ‘group’ to begin with is elusive. The concept is not 
elaborated in the travaux préparatoires, despite bearing relevance for the genocide 
framework. Granted, attempts to exhaustively define this notion would have been futile,140 
since groups are social phenomena that can not be described, quantified or measured as were 
they  material objects.141 They can, however, be transformed. By means of argumentation and 
interpretation a ‘human group’ can be constructed as such, transformed through description 
against a certain background.
Notwithstanding the complexities in defining ‘groups’ on a theoretical level, collective life is 
an essential part of human existence and may serve a plethora of values. Value, of course, has 
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a multitude of parameters. Discerning between such parameters may be just as difficult as 
trying to ring-fence and define groups to begin with. One valuable aspect of group  life may 
relate to facilitating for biological needs by means of mutual effort.142  Another aspect may 
concern contractual arrangements of employment.143  Although, there is undoubtedly more 
depth to belonging to a group than these ‘primal’ interests. Human groups go beyond being 
instruments for triggering individual rights or managing social control. Collective affinity can 
also function as an important facet of individual identity.144 Ronald R. Garet suggests that 
‘personhood, communality, and sociality are structures of existence, components of human 
being which are necessary to it.’145
The intentional destruction of a particular group  violates the group  members’ right to life. 
It also harms humanity as a whole; the vanishing of a group is a loss bearing connotations to 
the extinction of other species.146  Prohibiting the physical and biological destruction of 
human groups as genocide can thereby be understood as an affirmation of the value the 
international society attaches to the survival of human diversity. The Genocide Convention 
convey  that group existence is important and denotes that certain groups have an intrinsic 
social value per se, and must consequently be protected ‘as such’.147 Transgressing this norm 
amounts to a conduct of ‘ultimate evil’ and the international society has deemed it important 
to proscribe criminalisation for such ‘evil’ deeds.148  Since the transgression is closely 
intertwined with the notion of groups, it  is inevitable that the legal construction of the crime 
of genocide mirrors this connectivity.
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4.1.1 Implications in Transforming Human Groups for Legal Objectives
Dealing with groups in a legal context turns out to be more complex than what prima facie 
could be expected, much since groups are without inherent meaning. All content is socially 
assigned through interpretation and argumentation. In a legal discourse, this operation is 
achieved in the context of ‘applicable law’. By means of legal nomenclature, the theoretical 
conception of a ‘group’ is diminished to a formal description, stipulating requirements for 
determining inclusion or exclusion. The description then becomes a vessel for rights and 
obligations.149 In turn, such requirements must be applied to the ‘everyday reality’. Thereby, 
legal actors – such as judges and prosecutors – take active part in mobilising specific 
discursive resources in establishing and creating a sense of legitimacy for the requirements 
that define the groups.150  Thus, it is these legal actors who realise the transformation of 
human groups from an ‘everyday  reality’ to a ‘legal reality’, through strategies of 
legitimation.
Since simplicity and clarity is sought after, where none is to be found, it is not far-fetched 
to deduce that forcing human groups into legal conceptions prompts cursory understandings 
of the groups in question. This is oftentimes achieved by having group  definitions revolve 
around quantifiable, ‘objective’ determinators, as if the groups were material objects. Indeed, 
that is what  the ICTR sought to do in Akayesu. The same thought  processes are evident in the 
historical precedents of genocide. For instance, Nersessian argues that in the Nazi practices of 
extermination during the Holocaust, the Nazis had problems ‘in parsing out a coherent legal 
definition for the Jewish community  or even in identifying its members’.151 Therefore, the 
Nazis forced the Jewish people and other victim classes to sow triangular cloth patches (with 
varying colours for each of the victim categories) of identification onto their clothes.152 This 
was reflected in the genocide in Rwanda, where identification of group affinity was achieved 
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by identification papers which described the keeper of the document as Hutu or Tutsi.153 
These practices show that dealing with ‘types’ of human groups is a cumbersome task. The 
same holds true in a legal setting. Despite the aforementioned complexities, the Genocide 
Convention opts for protecting four, clearly delimited, but narrowly construed human groups.
4.2 Reacting to the Restraints in the Application of Article II
As noted above, the restrictive personal scope of the Genocide Convention has sparked 
critique from scholars as well as practitioners.154  The criticism has often emanated into 
creative interpretations of the treaty text, or finding something ‘new’ from the travaux 
préparatoires to solve the ‘faulty’ Article II. The assertions seemingly take aim to reach a 
predetermined conclusion of including a certain human group. Such an altruistic goal is 
respectable. The jurisprudence, however, is not. Below, I will elaborate why.
4.2.1 Stable and Permanent Groups 
In the setting of the ICTR, problems concerning whether the Tutsi could be considered a 
protected group pursuant to Article II of the Genocide Convention emerged. The first  case 
dealing with this issue was Akayesu, which concerned Jean-Paul Akayesu, the mayor of a 
Rwandan commune during 1993-1994.155 He was charged with genocide before the ICTR for 
a multitude of genocidal acts committed in the commune. Early  in the proceedings, the 
tribunal noted that  it was unquestionably ‘the Tutsi ethnic group which was targeted’ by the 
Hutu majority government solely on account of their affinity to the Tutsi.156  The 
categorisation of the Tutsi as an ‘ethnic group’ emanated from their history  of being 
distinguished from the Hutu by previous colonial authorities as well as between the 
Rwandans themselves. This was not sufficient to fit the Tutsi within the scheme of an ‘ethnic 
group’ in the sense of the Genocide Convention, since, turning to the defining characteristics 
of ‘ethnic groups’ under the Convention, it becomes evident that  the Tutsi and the Hutu who 
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decimated them share many traits. Disregarding the racial, or even racist,157 considerations of 
the colonial authorities, they share same language, religion and essentially  the same 
culture.158  This prompted the tribunal to scrutinise the theoretical underpinnings for 
protecting groups ‘as such’. As noted in Chapter 3, the tribunal set out to establish ‘objective’ 
definitions of each of the four groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention – reflected in 
Article 2 of the ICTR Statute.159 Following, the tribunal turned to the travaux préparatoires 
and determined that the common denominator for the enumerated groups was that 
membership normally was unchallengeable by its members, ‘who belong to it automatically, 
by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner’.160  By continued reference to the 
travaux préparatoires, the tribunal took the position that it was ‘particularly important to 
respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention’.161  This led the Trial 
Chamber to the conclusion that  the drafters’ intention was ‘patently to ensure the protection 
of any stable and permanent group’.162 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu departed 
from a formalist reading of Article II and found it possible to construct the physical or 
biological destruction of a group ‘as such’ as genocide, even if a victimised group fell outside 
the confines of the four enumerated groups. That is, insofar the group is stable and 
permanent. Through an instrumentalist approach, the Tutsi could thereby comprise a 
protected group within the framework of the Genocide Convention.
There is reason, I would argue, to approach the jurisprudence in Akayesu with skepticism. 
The overarching goal with the judgment was likely to expand the groups encompassed by the 
Convention to fit into an ‘everyday reality’ that had changed since the drafting of the 
Convention. However, as a first remark, the travaux préparatoires are scarcely so consistent 
that it is possible to talk about an intent with it. A large number of states took part  in the 
negotiations,163  with many conflicting interests.164  Furthermore, declaring standpoints in 
42
157 Ibid, para. 82.
158 As follows from Chapter 3, these parameters are used to define ethnic groups.
159 Akayesu, supra n. 101, paras. 512-515.
160 Ibid, para. 511.
161 Ibid, para. 516.
162 Ibid, para. 516.
163 A total number of 57.
164 See supra Chapter 2.
treaty negotiations are hardly binding sources of international law. They may  provide 
evidence for opinio juris, but  as substantive legal sources, their use is limited. Additionally, it 
follows from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) that recourse to the 
preparatory works of international treaties, such as the Genocide Convention, may be had 
when the provision ‘leaves the meaning ambiguous’, or ‘leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd’.165 This is unlikely the case for the Genocide Convention. Article II encompasses four 
groups. It would surely have followed from the treaty  text if the intent, especially a 
‘manifest’ ditto, was to extend the protection of the Convention to all stable and permanent 
groups. If taken seriously, the ‘stability and permanence’ criterion would mean that the 
catalogisation of groups in Article II is meaningless. That is not a plausible interpretation. 
Moreover, the ‘stable and permanent’ criterion is most likely incompatible with the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege, seeing as it practically constructs an open-ended penal 
prohibition.
Secondly, arguing for stability and permanence as the sole parameters worth protecting in 
groups is conceptually confusing. Dialectically, the tribunal argued that group  members in a 
‘redeemable manner’ can not be ‘stable and permanent’. However, many  of the groups 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention allow redeemable group membership. It  is possible 
to exit  a religion. It is possible to terminate nationality. Ethnicity  can be achieved through 
marriage and terminated through divorce.166 The argument is contradictory. Therefore, I argue 
that the ‘stability  and permanence’ criterion developed in Akayesu should be discarded when 
approaching the rationale of protecting groups pursuant to the Genocide Convention.
4.2.2 Other Ideas – Pinochet and Customary International Law
Akayesu is not  alone in its attempt to align the ‘legal reality’ with changing discourses of 
‘everyday reality’. From one perspective, the indictments of Augusto Pinochet, then-dictator 
of Chile, by  Spanish lower instance courts are examples of this. Shortly after the creative 
interpretation in Akayesu, the Spanish Court of Appeals followed suit and departed from a 
verbatim reading of the treaty text. The Court of Appeals argued that the concept of a 
‘national group’ as it  follows from the Genocide Convention, in fact, also encompasses 
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political as well as social groups.167 The Court noted that genocide should be approached in 
‘social terms, without any need for a criminal law definition’.168  This line of reasoning is, 
however, hard to reconcile with principles of legality, especially the nullum crimen sine lege-
principle. The Court of Appeals seemingly extended the definition of the crime by virtue of 
its analogous interpretation of what a ‘national’ group is. The extension, in turn, opens the 
scope of application of the concept of a ‘national’ group  to virtually  all socially  constructed 
labels. Consequently, due to its discrepancy with principles of legality, it is a reasonable 
conclusion to draw that such an interpretation is not entirely legitimate.
It can be mentioned in the context that scholars have suggested to introduce new victim 
categories as a matter of customary law.169 The proposal per se might not be incorrect. There 
is, however, no jurisprudential clarity  in this regard – not much has changed in the ‘legal 
reality’.170
4.3 Viewing the Crime of Genocide as a Rights-Implementing Institute
The section above concluded that the narrow conceptualisation of the protected groups under 
Article II of the Genocide Convention has sparked a myriad of arguments for introducing new 
victim categories within the framework for the crime of genocide. While these assertions 
might not withstand scrutiny, they highlight that the Genocide Convention is having 
difficulties answering to contemporary challenges concerning the groups it protects, in 
situations where utilising the Convention appear appropriate. Perhaps, the answer to these 
conundrums will not lie in extravagant readings of the treaty text, or unearthing something 
from the travaux preparatoires. A more appropriate approach would be to ascertain if there is 
a more systemically  plausible path to achieving these goals. Such an operation first requires 
disentangling the theoretical underpinnings for including some groups and excluding others. 
In this section, I attempt to do so. Initially, however, it should be noted that the idea of 
expanding the list of the protected groups is not entirely novel. The debate has been ongoing 
for close to seventy years. It  has been proposed that including new groups places a loose lid 
44
167 Reed Brody and Michael Ratner, The Pinochet Papers – The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain 
(London: Kluwer, 2000), p. 100.
168 Ibid, p. 100.
169 Beth Van Schaack, supra n. 67, p. 2259.
170 See Robert Cryer et al, supra n. 100, p. 210.
on the Pandora’s box of protecting human groups, and that there would be no ‘logical 
stopping point’ if new groups were added.171  Schabas assumes this formalist position, as 
opposed to an instrumental ditto, noting that a dilemma with introducing new groups is ‘the 
difficulty in providing a rational basis for such a measure’. He argues that if one group is to 
be included ‘why not the disabled, or other groups based on arbitrary criteria?’172  The 
argument is intriguing and needs to be probed further. This will be done in the section below.
4.3.1 Why Should Not All Groups Be Protected Under the Genocide Convention?
Seeing as the transformation of groups for legal purposes can not be anything but ‘arbitrary’ 
and ad hoc, it  seems unreasonable to preclude protection of human groups on that ground.173 
Interestingly, departing from a micro-comparative perspective, a few parties to the Genocide 
Convention have opted for a wider conceptualisation of the protected groups as a matter of 
domestic law. Burkina Faso, Congo and France have constructed the list of protected group  to 
end with a residual category, encompassing ‘any arbitrary group’.174  The overarching 
rationale can be explained by  the fact that any  arbitrary group could, theoretically, be subject 
to genocidal extermination. Notwithstanding which group this may be, such conduct  is 
abhorrent and the group  in question must be protected. From such a point of departure, 
gender groups would undoubtedly qualify as protected.
The standpoint is sympathetic, and while it does have some merit, it  does not withstand 
closer examination. Genocide is a sui generis crime, seeking to protect the human diversity of 
groups. To preserve the crime’s standing at the ‘apex of international criminality’, it can not 
have a too wide scope of application. Such an order could effectively render the concept of 
genocide to become diluted of substance; a logic that relates to the ‘expressivist function’ of 
genocide.175 Legal constructions ought to reflect the broader social and political discourses in 
which they exist. Thus, there is commendable wisdom in not encompassing all ‘arbitrary’ 
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groups pursuant to the Genocide Convention. Likely, the drafters arrived to the same 
conclusion, seeing as they opted for enumerating four different groups as protected from 
genocide.
4.3.2 The Exclusion of Political Groups from an E Contrario Perspective
Bearing in mind that the Genocide Convention takes a different path than protecting any 
‘arbitrary’ group, there is cause to ponder the premises for selecting the listed groups in 
Article II. Are they unique to those groups enumerated, or is it possible to extend them to 
other collectives in a similar manner? The very question takes for granted that the victim 
classes were determined on the basis of a ‘rational choice’ by the drafters, as opposed to a 
result of political deliberations made almost seventy years ago. In any case, different 
suggestions have been advanced for explaining the conceptual underpinnings of including 
the chosen groups. Here, the exclusion of political groups will be considered. It is my 
standpoint that the ratio for excluding a particular group from protection provides an e 
contrario solution to the reasoning for including other groups. Such an operation can be 
described as a dialectic process; the grounds for exclusion is the thesis, and the logic for 
inclusion the antithesis.176
The 1978 Genocide Study delineated the five principal arguments for the exclusion of 
political groups.177 They were the following: ‘a) a political group has no stable, permanent, 
clear-cut characteristics, b) including political groups would preclude the acceptance of the 
Genocide Convention by a large number of States, because it would involve the UN in 
internal political struggles, c) such inclusion would create difficulties for legally  established 
Governments in preventive actions against subversive elements, d) protection of political 
groups would bear way for protecting economic and professional groups under the Genocide 
Convention and e) the protection of political groups should be ascertained outside the 
Genocide’.178
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It therefore seems as if there were a multitude of traits which made the Sixth Committee 
construct political groups as excluded. I will more closely  investigate points a)-b).179  The 
most conspicuous argument for excluding political groups – and e contrario including other 
groups – is the argument of permanence and stability. Notwithstanding being neatly placed 
first in order in the 1978 Genocide Study’s chart, the ICTR in Rutaganda held that
It appears from the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, that certain groups, such as 
political and economic groups, have been excluded from the protected groups, because they are 
considered to be ‘mobile groups’ which one joins through individual, political commitment. That would 
seem to suggest […] that the Convention was presumably intended to cover relatively stable and 
permanent groups.180
Tracing back the debate in the Sixth Committee, some support for this view can be provided. 
Delegates furthering the cause for the exclusion of political groups from protection based 
their arguments on the essence, character or nature of the groups selected for inclusion. The 
Brazilian delegate opined that ‘political groups should not be included in the groups to be 
protected, since they lacked the necessary  homogeneity  and stability’.181  Concurring, the 
Egyptian delegate found it ‘dangerous to extend protection to political groups in view of the 
frequent and inevitable changes of political opinion’.182  Lastly, in the conclusion of the 
deliberations, the Polish delegate contended that ‘genocide is basically  a crime committed 
against a group of people who had certain stable and characteristic features in common’.183
Stability  and permanence per se are not satisfactory criteria for inclusion/exclusion, 
however. As noted in Section 4.2.1, many  of the groups listed are not necessarily  of such 
character. For instance, turning to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), an 
instrument adopted in the same temporal context as the Genocide Convention, Articles 15 and 
18 ascertain that no one shall be denied the right to change their nationality or religion. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, is that  in reality, the victims of genocidal acts have no 
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say whether they will be targeted by a perpetrator or not. The social dimension of stability 
and permanence is superseded by the génocidaire’s intent to destroy a particular group.
A different explanation to the exclusion of political groups is a wholly practical one. As 
noted by the 1978 Genocide Study in point b), the exclusion of political groups was a means 
to enable a swift ratification of the Genocide Convention. Schabas argues in this regard that 
excluding political groups ‘was not a principled decision based on some philosophical 
distinction between stable and more ephemeral groups’,184  but rather that historic 
victimisation is the relevant qualification.185 In support for his claim, he holds that the drafters 
had the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust in mind during the drafting process.186  This 
historical perspective is insufficient, however. Referencing practical reasons for determining 
certain groups for protection may be a plausible explanation for determining specific groups. 
Such explanations, however, can never exhaustively  justify the scope of which groups to 
protect – atrocities on a genocidal scale are not limited to these four groups alone.
Accordingly, it is possible to draw conclusions relating to what constructs a group not 
worthy of protection, and e contrario, what constructs a group worthy of protection. The 
importance of the political aspect in the relation between ICL and the international society 
should not be understated. Since genocide constructs an erga omnes obligation on States, they 
will prove hesitant  to label acts, however nefarious, as genocide. The historical example of 
Rwanda, where the atrocities committed towards the Tutsi almost fell short of being labelled 
genocide, serves to highlight the unwillingness. On this rationale, the Jastrow Duck Rabbit 
figure can be applied – law and politics can be viewed as part of the same ‘creature’.187  For 
political groups, the absence of political impetus rendered them unworthy of protection. E 
contrario, the existence of political will rendered the enumerated groups protected. In 
similarity with political groups, the crux for considering gender groups lies in questions of an 
intrinsic political character. The counterargument, however, is the claim that ‘despite criticism 
that the enumeration of protected groups within the Convention is limited and restrictive, the 
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final result is coherent.’188 The notion is that the drafters sought to protect  a certain typology 
of human groups, ‘national minorities’, and that the protected groups can not be considered as 
isolated islands, but rather an archipelago. The criticism is that each of the groups overlap  and 
help  define ‘a singular reality’.189  From such a point of view, political groups and gender 
groups, are simply not the kind of human typology the Convention seeks to protect. Thereby, 
it may be conceded that there is no rational basis to move beyond the current scheme of the 
protected groups. However, the historical underpinnings of the concept of genocide contradict 
such an analysis profoundly. It is certainly not the only possible conclusion to draw. 
Resolution 96(1) encompassed a large number of collectives, the Secretariat’s Draft contained 
a non-exhaustive list of protected groups and political groups were scrapped in a close 
referendum by the Sixth Committee near the very end of the drafting process.190 Bearing all 
this in mind, it is difficult  to imagine the end-result  being a collected, theoretical 
determination that other collectives were conceptually unfit within the framework. That does 
not mean that the protected groups are not an ‘ensemble construction’.191  They do indeed 
overlap considerably. Although, a more feasible characterisation for the determination of the 
enumerated groups is that they  were chosen on the basis of ensuring sufficient ratification of 
the treaty. In that, the drafters were successful, but it was nothing short of a political choice. 
Such a choice does not per se preclude gender groups from being conceptualised as a 
‘protected group’ as a theoretical question.
4.3.3 The Common Factor for the Protected Groups
All of the protected groups rest on one underlying premise. The groups are different, 
important, facets of individual identity. Associating with the protected groups can be assumed 
to be, for the individuals, paramount to the extent that the members of the groups should not 
be forced by means of physical or biological genocide to relinquish the affinity  to their 
collectivity. This analysis is supported by the perception of ‘human groups’ as social 
constructs rather than scientific, quantifiable items. Indeed, bearing in mind the ‘subjective 
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approach’ discussed above, the scientific accuracy is irrelevant in ascertaining the crime of 
genocide. It  is the perspective of the génocidaire that determines the group membership. 
There is no need whatsoever for the génocidaire to be rational in their targeting for 
destruction. For instance, notwithstanding that racial categorisation is discarded within a 
modern science discourse, it does not preclude a génocidaire from committing genocidal acts 
on that basis.192  The sole parameter to ascertain is whether the perpetrator had a 
discriminatory intent to exterminate, in part or in whole, a group  based on national, ethnical, 
racial or religious affinity.193 It matters not that the group can be objectively defined as one of 
the four groups, or even that the group de facto existed. The institute that is the crime of 
genocide uses ‘groups’ as an analytical framework and the group that matters is purely 
conceptual. A group in the sense of the Genocide Convention can not be anything else than ad 
hoc in a specific context; construed as a product of ex post analysis employed by  legal actors, 
in order to satisfy legal requisites.
The overarching rationale behind the protected groups can thus be described as the 
protection of individuals’ right to take part and form a kind of collective and shared existence. 
Within a legal framework of ‘applicable law’, this operation becomes simplified. This is due 
to the fact that it is easier to speak in terms of acts directed at ‘protected groups’ in a court of 
law rather than acknowledging that the groups that we speak of do not exist in reality, but 
only as impromptu constructions. As such, they become a symbol for transgressions of an 
intrinsic value of human life. The legal construction of ‘protected groups’ can therefore, I 
argue, be perceived as a proxy  for the rights of individuals to engage in different types of 
collectivity with freedom from being subject to genocidal acts. Hence, the ‘crime of 
genocide’ is best understood as an instrument that ascertains these imperative rights of 
individuals through taking care of a particular group. The systemic order can be compared to 
the international human rights system, where individual rights are of principal importance. 
The human rights system, on the other hand, rest on the premise that group rights are 
ascertained through individuals.194 Seeing as the Convention’s protected groups build on the 
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effective exercise of human rights that can only be coherent in communion on a collective 
scale, it is plausible that the Genocide Convention follow a similar logic, albeit reversed.
4.4 An Ejusdem Generis Approach to Gender Groups and the Protected Groups
With the foregoing section as a backdrop, I seek to employ the interpretative canon of 
ejusdem generis, to analyse if not the conceptual parameters of inclusion can be extended in a 
similar manner to gender groups, or if they are sui generis to the groups enumerated. The 
underlying premise is that if gender groups are of a similar kind, including gender groups 
within the Convention’s legal protection under the same framework may appear plausible. 
The thesis encircles gender groups for three main reasons. First, gender rights are of a similar 
character to those of the enumerated collectives. Second, gender collectives often intersect 
and overlap with the enumerated groups. Lastly, there are ample examples of ‘gendercides’ as 
a matter of history.
4.4.1 Gender Groups in Comparison to the Protected Groups
Bearing in mind the employed gender theory in the thesis, gender groups are highly volatile 
and temporal. Although used in reference to exclude political groups, stability  and 
permanence can not adequately justify the inclusion of groups in the Genocide Convention. 
As argued above, not all of the enumerated groups are stable and permanent. Indeed, the 
conceptualisation of gender groups intersects to a large extent with how ethnical and racial 
groups are constructed. As follows from Chapter 3, the concept  of ethnicity is hinged to 
parameters of common language or culture, whereas the concept of race to a criterion of 
‘hereditary  physical traits’. Gender groups can be perceived as an amalgamation of these 
conceptualisations, drawing from Butler’s gender theory. It is a socially  constructed label, 
influenced by social and cultural preconditions. The notion that they are akin to each other is 
mirrored in other dimensions of ICL. In fact, gender groups are warranted equal treatment to 
ethnical and racial groups in, for instance, the Rome Statute.195
In similarity  to the four enumerated groups, belonging to a gender group can be assumed 
to be an intrinsic value of social existence, an important facet of individuality.196  Such a 
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resemblance is reflected within the scheme of international human rights law. Seeing as 
genocide is the ‘ultimate crime and the gravest violation of human rights it  is possible to 
commit’,197 such a comparison is fruitful. The enumerated groups can all be characterised by 
the rights that are granted through membership. That is, the right to existence in the property 
of a group member, be it on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion. The rights of 
gender groups follow a similar rationale, and essentially  stem from an identification of 
oneself against a collective backdrop, coupled with the right to live a collective life as a 
member of that particular group. All major international human rights treaties prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of gender and/or sex.198  The same holds true for all of the 
enumerated groups. Indeed, that is the case in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the UDHR.199  It is not necessary  to draw the finer 
contours of the substantive human rights here actualised. Genocide and ‘gendercide’ aim 
attention to the physical or biological destruction of a particular group. As such, they will 
always deal with the most severe infringements of fundamental human rights (such as the 
right to life). It  is crucial not to exaggerate this aspect, however. It is not the transgression of 
these rights per se that merits the label ‘genocide’. Apart from these individual rights, 
genocide violates the group’s right  to existence. Nonetheless, the protected groups depart 
from a perspective where paramount collective rights are transgressed through serious 
personal violence, which may necessitate treating the encroachment as genocide.200 It is on 
the aforementioned substantive fundamental rights the protected groups build on, and the 
rights apply equally to gender groups. Hence, the continued exclusion of gender from the 
Genocide Convention is disparate with the international human rights structure. If, then, other 
groups that can be considered similar to gender groups have a right to existence, coupled with 
a right not to be refused that existence, groups on the basis of gender must do as well.
The characterisation of gender groups overlap  considerably with national, ethnic, 
religious and racial parameters. Oftentimes, complexities arise in determining whether the 
targeting of a particular group builds on the traits of any of the enumerated groups, gender 
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traits, or if it  is a mix between these parameters. Should a génocidaire seek to exterminate all 
‘abled-bodied’201 Bosnian Muslim men – would this be a ‘gendercide’ or a genocide enacted 
towards a protected group?202  Whichever interpretation gains precedence, it is my analysis 
that ‘all genocides are gendered’.203  The subjective approach merely requires that the 
genocidal acts are essentially based on any of the enumerated traits. A ‘gendered aspect’ of 
the genocide is simply sorted away as legally  irrelevant. Should an attack be directed against 
able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men, then the ‘Bosnian’ and ‘Muslim’ labels are sufficient in 
ensuring the application of the Genocide Convention. The omission to protect gender groups 
has, however, more dimensions than merely ensuring application of a legal instrument in 
order to prevent impunity. As of now, a perpetrator can claim that a genocidal act was 
committed on gendercidal basis as a viable defence for the crime of genocide. In turn, the 
current construction of the protected groups, in fact, favours gender discrimination over, for 
instance, religious discrimination. Drawing from a feminist legal theory perspective, this is 
disparate with the commitment ‘to promote social progress’ as a cardinal value and specific 
purpose for the UN as an institution. Especially since it is through legal instruments, such as 
the Genocide Convention, this value is to be realised.204 If the UN’s underlying engagement 
to ‘international social justice’, which has been argued to form the ‘essence of public 
international law in the second half of the 20th century’,205  is to be taken seriously, there is 
great need to consider how gender groups fit in within this structure. The analysis 
demonstrates that gender collectives are of a similar kind to the protected groups. 
Consequently, it would not be striking to extend similar treatment to gender groups in the 
context of genocide.
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4.4.2 A Historical Reality
Gender groups have been subject to genocidal acts like few other collectives. Much due to the 
fact that  the victims of such atrocities oftentimes have been women, these occurrences have 
taken the back seat in the history  books. There is a plethora of historical examples of 
‘gendercidal’ practices that fit the conceptual frame of genocide; witch-hunts in Early Modern 
Europe, Sati (i.e widow burning), dowry deaths and maternal mortality are but a few. 
There are specific historical events where gender groups have been victimised as such. 
The Nanking Massacre, the Massacre of Bangladesh men in 1971, the École Polytechnique 
Massacre and the genocide in Srebrenica are all examples of where gender-specific elements 
have been highly prevalent in situations of mass killings.206 ‘Gendercides’ are thus a historical 
reality, and seem to cry out for the application of the Genocide Convention. Such an assertion 
does not mean that other, non-enumerated human groups are subordinate to gender groups. 
Other collectives may fit the theoretical underpinnings of protecting certain human groups 
from genocide as well. They will not, however, be considered here. The fact that other human 
groups may be equally as appropriate candidates should not hamper the overarching 
discussion as it relates to gender groups, which is the focal point here. Ascertaining eligibility 
for other groups is a different question, and is not relevant for the issue of ‘gendercide’ in 
relation to genocide.207
4.5 Concluding Remarks
As outlined by the foregoing analysis, gender groups are of a similar kind to the enumerated 
groups in Article II of the Genocide Convention. Thereby, similar treatment can be motivated 
for gender groups as for the enumerated groups in Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
The notion presupposes that the Genocide Convention provides relevant legal ‘tools’ to 
respond to ‘gendercides’. Is this accurate, or are there appropriate means to redress 
‘gendercides’ in other dimensions in international law?
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5 Analysis of Other International Law Instruments
The following chapter asks whether ‘gendercides’ already are appropriately responded to 
under existing international law instruments that cover similar interests to the Genocide 
Convention. In this regard, Schabas argues that atrocities committed ‘against groups not 
covered by  Article II of the Genocide Convention are adequately addressed by other legal 
norms, in particular the prohibition of crimes against humanity.’208 In a similar vein, the 1978 
Genocide Study notes that other groups than the ones enumerated in Article II are sufficiently 
protected by ‘other international instruments, such as the [UDHR] and the [ICCPR]’.209  In 
what follows below, I engage in a comparative analysis and ponder whether the interest of 
protecting gender groups ‘as such’ from physical and biological destruction is satisfied by the 
aforementioned instruments.
5.1 Crimes Against Humanity – An Adequate ‘Proxy’?
Genocide and crimes against humanity can be perceived as ‘sister crimes’. Both of the 
infractions were constructed against the historical backdrop of the Nazi acts of extermination 
during the Holocaust. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the CC10 conceptualised genocide as a 
subcategory of crimes against humanity.210 The two crimes currently have diverging raisons 
d’être, and protect different values. A widespread or systematic attack on a gender group, 
because the members belong to that group, amounts to crimes against humanity. That is very 
different to an attack on a gender group  because the members belong to that  group  paired 
with the intent to destroy the gender group  ‘as such’.211 National, ethnical, racial and religious 
groups are all protected from crimes against humanity, as well as the crime of genocide.212 In 
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case gender groups are subject to genocidal acts, only crimes against humanity can be 
applied, since there is no parallel crime for genocide committed on the basis of gender. This 
begs the question, is crimes against humanity  adequate to describe criminal conduct seeking 
to destroy gender groups ‘as such’? I do not think so. Making reference to crimes against 
humanity as a surrogate for a ‘gendercide’ risks inadequately reflecting the content of the 
criminal categories. The socially constructed ‘label’ of a crime, to which the criminal conduct 
is attached, ought to mirror the culpability and seriousness of the offence in an appropriate 
manner.213  Genocides will in the practical reality oftentimes satisfy the requirements for 
crimes against humanity. The same can not be said for the opposite relation, because of the 
dolus specialis of genocide. Constructing a ‘gendercide’ as a crime against  humanity does not 
in any way demarcate the perpetrator’s overarching and specialised intent to destroy a 
specific group ‘as such’, which is far more culpable. A perpetrator of crimes against humanity 
aims to murder, whereas a génocidiare aims to destroy a certain group. The construction of 
genocide is thus much more specified in terms of mens rea in comparison to crimes against 
humanity. The same can be said for the prohibited acts of genocide. As follows from Chapter 
3, only five specific acts can be qualified as genocide. Crimes against humanity could surely 
encompass those acts, but is not limited to them. The specificity the legal label of genocide 
offer is thus far more complete in describing ‘gendercidal’ conduct.
From a different perspective, labelling ‘gendercide’ as crimes against humanity confuses 
the personal scope of the crimes. While crimes against humanity are prohibited as a type of 
persecution against the individual attacked, genocide is the exact converse. Genocide is 
fundamentally an infraction directed towards groups, and the criminalisation thereof 
ascertains protection for certain ‘groups’ from physical and biological destruction. Crimes 
against humanity encompass violations of fundamental rights on an individual basis.214  In 
case a ‘group’ will be covered by crimes against humanity, it will be purely ancillary to the 
individual. Therefore, crimes against humanity are unable to adequately describe attacks 
against groups. This distinction is of paramount importance, as David Luban notes: 
Thus, whereas genocide is a crime directed at groups viewed as collective entities, with a moral dignity 
of their own, crimes against humanity are assaults on civilian populations viewed not as unified 
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metaphysical entities but simply as collections of individuals whose own human interests and dignity are 
at risk […].215
The distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity is important in other aspects. 
They  both entail an erga omnes obligation for the international society to intervene and 
prevent the atrocity occurring in a given situation. The obligation is, as noted by the ICJ, 
‘legal, and not merely  symbolic’.216 When it comes to genocide, this obligation is actualised 
as soon as ‘the State learns of […] the existence of a serious risk  that genocide will be 
committed’.217 This is in line with the conception of genocide as an inchoate offence directed 
towards the protected groups.218 If gender groups are subject to genocidal acts, the obligation 
will not be activated at  that temporal point. Only crimes against humanity can be applied in 
that case; and they do not invoke the erga omnes obligation until the attack has taken place. 
Thereby, the factual widespread or systematic attack directed against the gender groups must 
have taken place before the erga omnes obligation is triggered.
The way we label crimes has a deeper meaning than solely relating to parameters of 
culpability of the crime. It  also expresses a form of hierarchy between the core international 
crimes, communicating the severity  of one crime in relation to the others. Genocide stands at 
the ‘apex of international criminality’.219 It is imagined to be the most heinous crime possible 
to commit – a sui generis offence. The moral condemnation implied with the locution 
‘genocide’ is far more serious than any other international crime. The hierarchy amongst the 
international core crimes is less acute for national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. Both 
criminal constructions can be applied in a parallel manner. As a matter of criminal 
cumulation, a perpetrator can be sentenced to genocide as well as crimes against humanity.220 
This renders courts capable of distinguishing between attacks directed towards individuals on 
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a widespread and systematic scale, and conduct intended to exterminate groups of 
individuals. They can therefore pass judgments that more accurately  describe the nature of the 
conduct, when directed towards any of the enumerated groups.
The same rationale does not apply for gender groups. Genocidal acts directed towards 
gender groups are either constructed as the inferior transgression crimes against humanity, or 
fall outside the ambit of ICL completely. Essentially, genocide and crimes against humanity 
have completely diverging reasons for being. At their core, they are two separate offences, 
dealing with different issues. The current scheme of the protected groups in the Genocide 
Convention communicates a value-based signal regarding which groups are more worthy  to 
protect from the worst kind of criminality. Drawing from a feminist legal theory perspective, 
it dialectically expresses the worth of gender groups in relation to the four enumerated 
collectives in Article II. In essence, the Genocide Convention is a bearer of symbolic values. 
From such a perspective, the way we construct legal categorisations is paramount. Surely, it is 
possible to describe the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust as episodes of ‘mass killings’. 
That categorisation would, however, be unsuccessful in capturing the whole picture of the 
atrocities committed and what the perpetrators set out to achieve. The same applies to 
‘gendercide’. There is wisdom in communicating a total recognition of criminal conduct. It 
was a similar rationale that spurred the international society to construct genocide in the first 
place. Seeing as ‘gendercides’ have existed historically and, as I argue below, continue to 
occur, the omission to cover ‘gendercide’ as genocide has factual ramifications. As a matter of 
de lege lata, there is no specific expression that gender groups are warranted protection from 
physical and biological destruction ‘as such’. That  leads to an odd result, meaning that the 
exact same conduct, coupled with the exact same intent committed towards members of 
gender collectives, for example women, will never be as serious as if directed towards any of 
the enumerated groups. Hence, crimes against humanity  is not  an adequate surrogate for 
genocide.
5.2 Human Rights Adjudicatory Bodies and Adjudication in the ICJ
5.2.1 Human Rights Adjudicatory Bodies
As mentioned above, the 1978 Genocide Study held that ‘other groups’ are sufficiently 
protected by the UDHR and the ICCPR. I do not concur. The former is a UNGA Resolution, 
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and the latter is a major human rights treaty.221  None of these instruments seek to regulate 
criminal activities. The remedies available to adjudicate human rights violations largely 
depend on voluntary, bona fides participation by States already parties to the treaties. The 
enforcement paradigm within the context of international human rights law is that 
adjudication of human rights violations (such as those amounting to ‘gendercides’), may be 
subject to quasi-legal enforcement mechanisms. The end-result of such adjudication is 
essentially  a ‘naming and shaming’ of the party  in breach. There can be no individual or non-
state responsibility for a certain violation in this context.222 On that note, it is likely that States 
– although eligible for participation – who commit ‘gendercides’, would refrain from giving 
consent to the quasi-judicial bodies’ jurisdiction.
Without  belittling the significance of these instruments, it  should be made clear that the 
form of adjudication offered through the human rights structure is ill-fitting for dealing with 
the physical and biological destruction of a gender group. Seemingly, this kind of destruction 
would be placed on par, and approached through the same framework as laws preventing 
women from selling clan land.223  However serious such violations of human rights may be, 
acts of ‘gendercide’ are far more abhorrent. Therefore, the current structure of human rights 
law fails to distinguish between, on the one hand, violations of human rights, and on the other 
hand, attacks with the intent of destroying the group, consequently constructing the group per 
se as a victim of the attack.224  Such a distinction is of importance, because the latter 
characteristic is the defining trait of ‘gendercide’. Turning a blind eye to that aspect would 
mean not dealing with ‘gendercides’ at all. Solely relying on the human rights scheme as a 
substitute for a stand-alone crime of ‘gendercide’ would thus not  provide an appropriate 
response.
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5.2.2 Adjudication in the ICJ
The ICJ may entertain contentious cases, meaning legal disputes between States submitted to 
it by  them, provided that both of the disputant States consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The ICJ 
solely settles legal disputes. Conversely, it  does not ascertain individual criminal 
responsibility, or in any other way engage in criminal ‘prosecution’ of breaches of 
international law. Therefore, turning to the ICJ to adjudicate ‘gendercides’ is somewhat 
problematic. The fact that participation in ICJ proceedings is entirely  based on consent makes 
it unsuitable for matters which essentially concerns criminal behaviour. It  is a likely 
assumption to make that States who engage in ‘gendercidal’ acts will be reluctant to approve 
of the ICJ’s jurisdiction. From a somewhat different perspective, in matters of the contentious 
cases, in contrast to the advisory proceedings, only States will be the possible disputants. 
Ergo, the ICJ will have no jurisdiction over individuals and non-state actors perpetrating 
‘gendercides’, much like within the human rights scheme.225 All these drawbacks render the 
mechanisms which ICJ offers inadequate to effectively respond to ‘gendercides’. It could be 
argued that the absence of an ‘effective enforcement’ opens for an increasingly  flexible 
system, which is not necessarily  a disadvantage in a strongly politicised system. Nonetheless, 
this forum is improper to address international crimes; the ICJ was not tailored to engage in 
such issues.
5.4 Labelling Matters
Simply  referring to other aspects of international law as a solution for ‘gendercide’ constructs 
a peculiar world of beliefs. First of all, such an approach creates an imagined safety net, 
legitimising a conservative standpoint and in turn enables a perception that the protection of 
gender groups from genocidal acts are ‘adequately addressed by other legal norms’.226 It is, 
however, clear that the adjudicatory  bodies the human rights treaties offer are ill-fitting to 
adjudicate criminal activities. The same holds true for the contentious cases in the ICJ. 
Neither the human rights adjudicatory  mechanisms nor the ICJ were designed to deal with 
such issues to begin with. None of them can provide a viable response in lieu of a separate 
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crime of ‘gendercide’. Indeed, as noted in Kondewa, when ‘the right to life is violated, 
certainly on the scale of genocide or massacre, only prosecution could be “effective” [...]’227 
as a redress to the infractions. If that argument is valid, it  should be borne in mind that the 
current routes to prosecution in the context  of ‘gendercides’ are practically non-existent. 
Apart from crimes against humanity, there are no international crimes available for 
application, and that criminal label available fails to appropriately describe the full nature of 
‘gendercides’. Thus, currently, no ‘effective’ means of redress to ‘gendercides’ exist.
The omission to protect from ‘gendercides’ in the Genocide Convention entails a strange 
systemic application of ICL. Returning to the narrative constructed in the introduction – a 
community  adopting a one-child policy, with the ancillary requirement that this one child 
must be male (meaning that all female children must be discarded). As follows from a 
formalist interpretation of Article II, we would currently label the murdered daughters, at 
‘best’, victims of crimes against  humanity. If we instead imagine that  the community adopted 
a policy of infanticide in respect of babies who bear certain ‘hereditary physical 
characteristics’ (whatever that may be), we would label the killed babies victims of genocide, 
since they would be constructed as a part of a ‘racial group’.228 The labels convey for us, the 
international society and the future, that the killed babies of the ‘racial group’ symbolise 
something bigger – genocide directed towards the ‘racial group’ itself. The murdered 
daughters, on the other hand, do not qualify for that symbolic treatment. Instead, ICL 
constructs that  victim category as a victim of its individual gender affinity. The destruction of 
the gender group on a wider level, which indeed was the aim with the adopted policy in the 
imagined example, is left unnoticed by ICL. After this analysis, the relevant inquiry  becomes 
whether criminal proscription under positive ICL is motivated to address ‘gendercides’. This 
will be done in the following chapter.
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6 ‘Gendercide’ and International Criminal Regulation
The chapters above focus on the nexus between genocide and ‘gendercide’, and ponder how 
they  fit together. The following chapter is forward-looking and ask the question of whether 
criminalisation of ‘gendercide’ is suitable per se. The evaluation will be carried out through 
general contemplations of the major theories of justification for international criminal 
regulation as well as the overarching aims of international criminal justice.
6.1 ‘Gendercide’ and ICL
The definition of a ‘gendercide’ elaborated above deviates from the definition of genocide 
only in one aspect; gender is not a protected group. The constituent act along with the 
perpetrator’s intent are identical to that  of genocide directed towards any of the enumerated 
groups. There is nothing that suggests that the sociological and psychological underpinnings 
of genocidal human behaviour is different when gender groups are targeted instead of the four 
protected groups.229 A conduct that can be described as ‘gendercide’ undoubtedly amounts to 
arduous violations of fundamental human rights. However, not all infractions of rights 
enunciated in human rights instruments are rendered criminal. Accordingly, viewing the crime 
of genocide as a rights-implementing institute is not the same as merely a detailed treatment 
of human rights violations. It  is also a seminal description of an international crime. 
Although, just as the describing of certain conduct as violating international law does not 
make it so, also describing certain conduct as criminal under international law does not ipso 
facto make it an international crime.230  The relevant inquiry becomes, is ‘gendercidal’ 
conduct sufficiently abhorrent to warrant criminalisation?
Before venturing further, there is reason to clarify what constitutes a crime in ICL more 
thoroughly. For the purposes here, international crimes are best  understood as ‘breaches of 
international rules entailing the personal criminal liability of the individuals concerned’.231 
International crimes, moreover, cover a dimension which includes ‘all norms that establish, 
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exclude or otherwise regulate’ individual criminal responsibility.232  Essentially, it  can be 
boiled down to prohibitions attached to a punitive system. From such a perspective, legal 
constructions ‘operates as a means for articulation and nourishment of social values’.233 These 
social values express desires; the legal constructs transform them into commitments. On a 
more conceptual note, criminalisation thus serves the protection of particular legal values.234
6.2 The Complexities in Characterising International Crimes
If the determining factor for the label ‘international crime’ is the value the prohibition 
protects – how does ‘gendercide’ relate to these values, and what are they to begin with? As a 
point of departure for these reflections, the preamble to the Rome Statute contains two 
noteworthy  indicators. First, alluding to ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity’ likely refers to the atrocious nature and wide scale of an act that 
elevates it to ‘criminal’. Second, by  virtue of making reference to ‘such grave crimes [that] 
threaten the peace, security  and well-being of the world’ it  denotes that considerations of 
broader geo-political safety are to be taken into account when characterising international 
crimes. I will examine these locutions immediately below.
6.2.1 ‘Unimaginable Atrocities that Deeply Shock the Conscience of Humanity’
The Preamble of the Genocide Convention notes that ‘genocide has inflicted great losses on 
humanity’.235  Hannah Arendt explores the same notion, stating that ‘finally, and most 
important, there were objections to the charge itself, that Eichmann had committed crimes 
against “the Jewish People”, instead of “against humanity” [...]’.236 At heart of these ideas lie 
the conviction that the more atrocious the act, the more likely  it is to be considered a crime of 
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international concern. It is likely  such a rationale the Rome Statute bridges to with its ‘first’ 
remark. The idea of a conduct ‘shocking’ the international conscience should not, I argue, be 
read as a nominal criterion, but rather a conceptual portrayal. Most often, the inquiry  of 
whether a conduct shocks the international conscience is answered against the backdrop of 
how widespread and abhorrent the conduct at issue is. For the purposes here, it is not 
necessary  to delineate the exact ontology of the doctrine. Suffice it to say, ‘gendercides’ are 
interlaced with widespread violations of human rights of the most severe form – conduct that 
certainly can be said to shock the international conscience.
To illustrate the foregoing, the ‘gendercide’ framework lends itself quite well to describe 
the contemporary discriminating discourses towards women and girls in India. Ranging from 
the close of the 20th century and onwards, the imbalance of the ratio between the sexes in the 
populace of India has sparked ample interest. It is a complex situation concerning female 
children before birth, at birth and during the first years of childhood. In a 2008 report from 
India’s National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, it was noted that in 
many regions in India
[s]ons are desired for reasons related to kinship, inheritance,  marriage, identity, status, economic security 
and lineage. A preference for boys cuts across caste and class lines and results in discrimination against 
girls even before they are born.237
Even though progress within the Indian society is made in regards to female literacy and 
increasing participation of women in different facets of economic and social life, girls are still 
being subject to a serious personal violence.238  Girls in India’s impoverished areas in 
particular are at risk of being disposed of by  their families directly after birth.239 Inter alia, 
the families lace infant girls’ food with pesticides, force grains of poppy seed or rice husks 
down their throats, stuffing their mouths with black salt or urea, starving them to death, 
64
237  NIPCCD. A Socio-Cultural Study of the Declining Sex Ratio in Delhi and Haryana.  (New Delhi: National 
Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, 2008). Available at: http://nipccd.nic.in/reports/
esratio.pdf (accessed 30 November 2017). 
238  T.V Sekher and Neelambar Hatti Sekher (eds),  Unwanted Daughters: Gender Discrimination in Modern 
India (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2010), p. 16.
239 Gita Aravamudan, Disappearing Daughters: The Tragedy of Female Foeticide. (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 
2007), p. 39.
suffocating them with a wet towel or a bag of sand, rubbing poison on the mother’s breast so 
that the child is poisoned as she is nursed, or burying the child alive.240  In consequence, 
female infanticide and other dowry related murders have brought about a gross number of 
women being selected for destruction for many decades. UNICEF has estimated that nearly 
fifty  million women are ‘missing’ in India.241  The destruction of girls and women on this 
scale can be understood as gender as a way of systematising social life, and is a product of an 
intersection of multiple parameters. Socio-economic aspects, such as high dowry costs, 
combined with religious traditions, the lack of personal autonomy of women due to unequal 
power structures between men and women are contributing factors.242  The occurrences in 
India fall squarely within the definition of a ‘gendercide’ this thesis employs.
The characteristics of the violated rights in the ‘Indian gendercide’ renders it tenable to 
construct ‘gendercide’ as a separate crime. It follows from Section 4.4.1 that ‘gender’ as a 
concept bears high relevance within the broader scheme of international human rights. 
Indeed, the conduct at issue ultimately concerns the right to life. The right, in itself, is sine 
qua non in relation to all other substantive human rights.243 For international law to, on one 
hand, protect individuals from gender-based discrimination, but, on the other, refrain from 
labelling the physical and biological destruction of gender groups an international crime 
constructs a systemic divergence. That is not all, however. The conduct also violates the 
group of girls’ claim to existence. Taken together, ‘gendercide’ is the ultimate form of gender 
discrimination, which emanates into serious personal violence that must be regarded to 
‘shock the international conscience’.
6.2.2 ‘Threats to Peace and Security’
The historically construed close connectivity between international crimes and their 
purportedly negative impact on international peace and security calls for further examination. 
It has been opined by  Kenneth Anderson that ICL ‘and the ICC are efforts to address the 
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“unstable” world’.244 The notion is supported with prior UNSC Resolutions in juxtaposition 
to its role under Article 39 of the UN Charter (perhaps Chapter VII in general), which is to 
determine any  ‘threat to peace’. Bearing in mind the characteristics of the entity  that  is the 
UNSC, whatever evaluations it makes, will always be inherently political. Notwithstanding 
complexities that may  arise in that nexus, the UNSC has, as a historical matter, considered 
certain conduct to be a ‘threat to peace’, and has warranted criminal prosecution. The 
creations of the ICTR and ICTY exemplify  this.245  It should be noted that conduct on the 
scale of the genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia does not ipso facto amount to a 
‘threat to peace’. However, all violations of fundamental human rights on a wide scale has the 
potential to be considered a ‘threat to peace’ by the UNSC. 
Similar to the notion of ‘shocking the international conscience’, there is no need to draw 
the finer contours of the current paradigm of the UNSC’s mandate. Departing from the 
backdrop  of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC may  use ICL to act in answer to 
certain conduct that gives rise to severe infractions to fundamental human rights. 
‘Gendercides’ are coherent with these discourses, seeing as committing gendercidal acts stays 
in line with the archetypical meaning of genocide; serious personal violence on a widespread 
level. The ‘Indian gendercide’ provides support for this claim. The gross number of girls 
‘missing’ can be regarded as a ‘threat to international peace’. Granted, it could be argued that 
the ‘Indian gendercide’ is a local issue. It is, however, a form of social sundering with 
connotations to the global sphere. The destruction does not necessarily ‘stay’ in India. It  may 
create ramifications for the international society in the form of, for example, refugees from 
the gendercidal conduct, or other spill-over effects that  may arise in a globalised world. In 
turn, this opens for tension between States, which very well may emanate into conflict. 
Conjointly, ‘gendercides’ can be considered a threat to international peace, and may motivate 
criminal prohibition.
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6.3 The Problems of Criminalising in the International Arena
The conceptual and philosophical underpinnings of proscribing crimes and taking punitive 
actions can not easily  be encircled. However difficult  to define in the abstract, what is 
attempted here is not to provide a finite answer to ‘what’ justifies a crime in the international 
arena. This section explores whether constructing ‘gendercide’ as an international infraction 
stays true to the dominant theories of legitimising international criminal regulation. 
It is, notwithstanding the above mentioned, safe to posit that the overall aims with the 
international criminal justice system are quite different from the ditto in a domestic context. 
The Rome Statute speaks of the main ambition with ICL being to ‘end to impunity  for the 
perpetrators of the [most serious crimes of concern to the international society as a whole] 
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’.246  Although, the idea behind 
criminalising and prosecuting separate offences on an international level may serve a plethora 
of different interests. In this regard, the ICTY has elaborated that retribution and deterrence 
are of specific importance.247  It has also asserted the relevance of denunciation and 
rehabilitation of offenders,248 along with other, broader objectives.249 Bearing in mind the 
nexus between ICL and the global political life, there is also an aspiration with the 
international criminal justice system to reconcile post-conflict societies, achieve peace, and to 
record history. There is, in other words, a lot going on when these goals are weighted against 
each other. This ‘weighing’ operation underlines the complex interconnectivity  between 
formalism and instrumentalism within the field of ICL; whether legal philosophy  should 
assimilate ethical standards or confine itself to an analysis of the ‘law as it stands’. 
Employing a legal positivist vocabulary, it is the perennial tension between de lege lata and 
de lege ferenda. It is not unexpected that the debate concerning ‘gendercide’ tends to 
reproduce this tension (or perhaps confusion) between what ICL is and what it ought to be.250 
It should be emphasised that it is not suggested here that ‘gendercide’ should or should not be 
an international crime. The question here, rather, is whether it could reach a point of 
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recognition as an international crime, departing from the perspective of developments in legal 
thought on the subject of justifying international criminal regulation.
6.3.1 Retribution and Deterrence
On the major themes of justifying criminalisation in the international arena, retribution is 
oftentimes referred to as of prime importance.251 Retribution is in this context to be defined so 
as ‘not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of 
the international community at these crimes’.252 Thereby, a retributive interest focuses on the 
‘necessity of punishing those who have violated societal norms’,253  and not an unmitigated 
form of lex talonis.254 There are difficulties with attaining retributive effect in an international 
setting. International crimes are concerned with the most horrendous kind of human 
behaviour, and whatever the punishment, it is hard to imagine it ever being proportionate to 
the offence. There is a risk of the punitive outcomes seeming puny  when compared to the 
actual infractions committed. ‘Merely’ hanging Adolf Eichmann appears disparate to all the 
million lives he was ultimately responsible for taking.255
In juxtaposition to retribution, deterrence is also deemed important in justifying 
international criminal regulation.256  Deterrence is in this context to be understood as 
‘punishment imposed to prevent both the offender and the population more generally from 
engaging in prohibited conduct’.257 Given this rationale, punishment and prosecution are used 
as a means to an end, seeking to prevent new transgressions from being committed. It 
moreover functions on two specific levels; to deter the perpetrator from committing the same 
crime again, and to deter society  in general from committing the same offence.258 Problems 
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emerge from this conceptualisation as well. It  is worth noting that the construction of 
deterrence departs from a liberal perspective, viewing human beings as capable of choosing 
rationally.259  This thesis, inspired by, post-modern tradition, takes the position that 
‘rationality’ is merely a chimaera. The choices of human beings and the perception of 
‘rationality’ is the result of a dynamic social process. Undoubtedly, the atrocities committed 
in the Holocaust were more often than not  committed by ‘simple’ humans; not monsters. 
From today’s perspective, their choices can without a shadow of a doubt be characterised as 
irrational, evil even, but due to the tangibility of social goods, the choices viewed in their 
time and place were socially favourable.
These conceptual complexities aside, the relation between a hypothetical, separate crime 
of ‘gendercide’ and these parameters is somewhat problematic. It  could be argued that such a 
construction would fit squarely within these underpinnings. ‘Gendercide’ is indeed culpable 
enough, I believe, to be punished as a matter of ex post. The nature of the conduct, moreover, 
is sufficiently abhorrent that it is worth deterring the general public from. Stopping the 
analysis here is, however, too superficial. The inherent modus operandi of ‘gendercides’ will 
not seldom involve homicide, which already is criminalised. It is not a reasonable assumption 
to make that hypothetical génocidaires of ‘gendercides’ will refrain from genocidal acts, 
simply  due to the legality of their conduct. Thus, these goals can not  not be said to be 
furthered to a discernible, cumulative extent by introducing a stand-alone crime of 
‘gendercide’.
6.3.2 Denunciation, Rehabilitation and Other Broader Goals
Proscribing a stand-alone crime of ‘gendercide’ would especially support the denunciative 
function of international criminal regulation. The incremental value of acknowledging 
‘gendercide’ as a separate offence lies in the accuracy of the criminal label, to see certain acts 
for what they are and to provide the tools for the international society  to morally, normatively 
and judicially  denounce that type of conduct. That ‘symbolic’ feature has been ever-present in 
the international criminal justice system. Returning to the historical picture of the post-war 
proceedings in Nuremberg, it was in their jurisprudence individual responsibility  in ICL first 
was constructed. The underlying logic follows the same scheme today; ‘crimes against 
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international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only  by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can provisions of international law be enforced.’260 
Whatever criticism may be directed towards these proceedings (too few charges, lack of due 
process and so forth),261 it is nonetheless clear that it paved the way for new discursive routes 
for international criminal justice, especially with the construction of individual criminal 
responsibility. These proceedings express an intimate emblematic feature; the international 
society coming together to denounce an atrocity in unison. Such a symbolic dimension is still 
relevant for international criminalisation. Proscribing a crime of ‘gendercide’ enables the 
international society to internalise the wrongdoing before the perpetrator, the victims and for 
the globalised world.262  Prosecuting ‘gendercides’ would raise awareness of the issue, and 
denounce that type of conduct in the international arena. Conversely, if ‘gendercides’ are not 
tried, the international society sends a message that the conduct is acceptable – and for 
whatever reason allowed to prolongate. 
There is also the promise of ICL as a path to rehabilitation of offenders into society.263 
This aim, albeit noble, is difficult to imagine bearing much weight, especially in the context 
of ‘gendercides’. Although, it could be argued that the prosecution of perpetrators of 
‘gendercides’ would turn them away from a reality composed of gender-based prejudice and 
thereby provide a ‘moral word’ for them, on a personal level.
The ICTY also stressed other, broader goals that emanate from an international criminal 
justice system. First, it noted that it provides routes for victim recognition by virtue of 
enabling them to see that ‘justice is being done’.264  Proscribing a separate offence of 
‘gendercide’ will not, stricto sensu, further that goal. The victims will not be alive to bear 
witness of such balancing of the scales. However, in an emblematic sense of victim 
recognition, the current order does not acknowledge the victims’ narratives of what kind of 
atrocity  they  have been subject to. Thereby, proscribing a separate crime of ‘gendercide’ 
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would undoubtedly mend that. For instance, through such a legal construction, the voices of 
the girls in the ‘Indian gendercide’ are transposed into the ICL discourse, appropriately 
considering their narratives.
Second, the ICTY opined that the international criminal justice system ‘creates a 
dependable historical narrative for the context’.265 I believe that a trial or the ICL system is 
not the appropriate setting at  all to determine ‘the’ correct historical interpretation. That is 
because there are no ‘correct’ historical interpretations. Such complexities aside, international 
prosecution can provide a historical narrative. Proscribing a crime of ‘gendercide’ would tell 
the tale that  the international society condemns the physical and/or biological destruction of 
gender groups. There is merit to considering the legacy of the age we live in.
Third, there is empirical research that shows that ‘the ICTY and the ICTR have 
significantly contributed to peace building in post-war societies, as well as introducing 
criminal accountability into the culture of international relations’.266  There is reason to 
believe that the proscription of a separate crime of ‘gendercide’ would contribute to post-
conflict reconciliation, particularly in terms of heightening awareness of ‘gendercidal’ 
practices on a local level. It would provide opportunities for promoting cultural 
transformation as a result of past atrocities, potentially infusing new social values in society 
at large. That form of transitional justice is particularly  relevant in the context of 
‘gendercides’, seeing as they are the result of social beliefs and prejudices.267
6.3.3 Does ‘Gendercide’ Fit the Conceptual Bases of International Criminal Regulation?
As a point of departure, it should be conceded that the foregoing discussion to a large extent 
has been speculative. As such, it may  call for more research, particularly in relation to the 
‘inputs/outputs’ of criminalisation. The limitations inherent in the method, however, renders 
such empirical questions unanswered here.268 Nonetheless, viewed against the backdrop  of 
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the major theories of justifying criminalisation in the international arena, I would like to 
conclude that there are no theoretical obstacles for constructing a stand-alone crime of 
‘gendercide’. Such a construction would further the discussed aims of the international 
criminal justice system – some to a larger degree than others. Thereby, it is coherent with the 
theoretical underpinnings of criminalisation in ICL. In particular, such a construction 
denounces more accurately the egregious act of physical or biological destruction of a gender 
group, and chronicles a phenomenon which oftentimes will amount to infraction of 
fundamental human rights on an extensive scale. Indeed, since ‘recognising the challenges of, 
and obstacles to, the effective investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based 
crimes’ has been a core aim for the ICC since 2014, it  seems particularly  tenable to perceive a 
stand-alone crime of ‘gendercide’ as in line with criminal regulation in ICL.
6.4 A Battlefield For Hegemonic Interests
The foregoing sections discuss whether criminalisation of ‘gendercide’ is suitable in and of 
itself. This question has been answered affirmatively. What does this tell us? First of all, the 
continued omission of including ‘gendercides’ within the ambit of the Genocide Convention 
ought to, from today’s perspective, be characterised as a choice. Ultimately, the current 
construction, the ‘choice’ made, relates back to the junction between formalism and 
instrumentalism. Systemically, the Genocide Convention’s construction of the protected 
groups in Article II is ‘formalist’ in the sense of proposing a certain a priori formal matrix of 
social space. It leans on a token ‘ahistorical’ formal framework defining the legal terrain 
within which the moot and endless game of contingent inclusions and exclusions occur.269
Departing from the notion that proscribing a separate crime of ‘gendercide’ is coherent 
with the major theories of international criminal regulation, it highlights that the Genocide 
Convention is in reality cast in an ‘empty container’.270 The content of the crime of genocide 
is not  predetermined. What ‘genocide’ will mean, what the term will include and what it  will 
exclude (that is, to the extent which and the way women, religious groups, national groups, 
disabled people and so forth are included or excluded in this structure), is always the result  of 
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contingent hegemonic struggle.271  The empty container emerges as a ‘battlefield’ for 
hegemonic interests. This battlefield does not  set out to reach some fixed content as its 
ultimate point of arrival, but only has itself as an objective, demarcated by  the ‘empty 
container’ that is ‘genocide’. Inherent in the struggle for hegemony, each position of interest 
seeks to impose its own rationale of inclusion/exclusion, and to denounce other interests as 
conceptually untrue. That is, advocating that  ‘the interest of pursuing protection of 
marginalised gender groups is most in line with the concept of genocide’ or ‘the four groups 
enumerated are the only  theoretical correct determination of the crime of genocide’. All these 
rationales are ‘politically salient, not structurally static’.272 The jurisprudence in the Genocide 
Convention opts for a culture of formalism. While this may not be adverse per se, such a 
formalist approach risks giving the appearance of the content in the instrument that  is the 
Genocide Convention as determinate and ‘ahistorical’ when that is not the case.
How are we, then, to view the ‘ahistorical’ status of the crime of genocide? I would like to 
argue that an ‘empty  container’ with no determinate meaning signifies only the existence of 
meaning in itself, in lieu of absence thereof.273  Seen from this perspective, the crime of 
genocide is an institution that has no definite, determinate function, but only  a negative one of 
expressing the actuality of the institution as such, instead of its in-existence. Following a 
Hegelian logic, such a rationale can be characterised as a direct embodiment of the 
ideological function of painting a ‘neutral’ picture in which all social antagonism is wiped 
out. Therefore, the ‘hegemonic battlefield’ is a struggle of how the ‘empty container’ is to be 
determined, and which political interests allowed to signify  it. A similar notion is explored in 
Chapter 2. In the same way the ‘silence’ concerning gender groups in the drafting process 
speaks, the absence of gender groups in the legal construction of the protected groups does, 
too. The interest  of protecting gender groups from physical and biological destruction is not 
considered politically  relevant; this expresses a counter-hegemonic position. This is, however, 
not static or determinate, but politically  changeable. After having done this analysis, we can 
now turn to the constructive level, and discuss potential ramifications emanating from the 
current construction of the crime of genocide.
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Part III: Constructive Theory
7 A Place for Gender?
7.1 Is it Theoretically Plausible to Include Gender Groups as Protected?
In the following section, I will put emphasis on some aspects, reflections and conclusions on 
the theoretical plausibility  of including gender groups as a protected group  in the Genocide 
Convention. The undertaking will be carried out through exposing potential ramifications of 
the omission to include gender groups as a protected group under Article II of the Genocide 
Convention, inspired by reasoning from feminist legal theory and post-modern research in 
ICL. The underlying premise is that the ramifications emerge as problematic in the sense that 
they  provide support for the claim that the Genocide Convention is unnecessarily narrow 
concerning the groups it grants protection; in particular to gender groups. Thereby, by virtue 
of their existence, the problems enable a hypothetical inclusion of gender groups as protected 
to appear theoretically  plausible. It should yet again be underlined that my ‘constructive’ 
approach does not carry the pretence that what is needed is to ‘construct’ additional policies 
and rules. I do not intend to advocate ‘let us just criminalise gendercide as genocide already!’. 
Rather, I seek to contribute to a better understanding of what transpires beneath the façade of 
the implementation and application of Article II of the Genocide Convention – particularly in 
relation to gender groups.274
7.1.1 The ‘Expressivist’ Function and the Legitimacy of the Construction of Genocide
Simply  expanding the Genocide Convention is a problematic venture. Indeed, ‘[d]iluting the 
definition, either by formal amendment of its terms or by extravagant interpretation of the 
existing text, risks trivialising the horror of the real crime when it is committed’.275 This is a 
legitimate apprehension. Stuart Stein opines that the analysis of scholars probing ‘other-cides’
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often [is] directed toward, or ends with, establishing that the mass killing cluster under consideration 
meets the definitional parameters of genocide, however defined. [...] What I wish to indicate is that 
establishing ‘genocidal credentials,’ or, in some cases their absence, is often considered to be of 
paramount importance, or necessary, by their authors.276
I do not seek to establish such ‘genocidal credentials’. The backdrop produced in Parts I-II 
attempts to highlight that the omission to protect gender groups under the Genocide 
Convention is an unreasonable restriction. The definition of ‘gendercide’ elaborated herein 
deviates from the definition of the crime of genocide in only one aspect; in terms of the 
protected groups. The analysis is faithful to the core concept of genocide, and only advocates 
the application of genocide in its prototypical meaning – to cover acts intended to destroy a 
human group  ‘as such’. The thesis thereby joins those scholars who argue that the failure to 
encompass other groups than the four enumerated has caused the Convention to become 
‘conceptually confused’.277
It is commonplace to argue that too wide a conceptualisation may render the crime of a 
genocide, in the eyes of the public, as less serious, or diminish the value-based signals it 
sends. However, the very  same danger to the legitimacy of the legal construct may  emerge if 
it is too narrow in its scope. If that is the case, the construction runs a risk of undermining 
what Dianne Marie Amann calls the ‘expressivist’ function of criminalising genocide, given 
that legal constructions reflect the broader social and political discourses in which they 
operate.278  As such, it  is of paramount importance that the way genocide is judicially 
constructed corroborates with the social and political reality  in which it exists. Should there 
be a discord, the crime risks losing legitimacy as it  may be seen as outdated and arbitrary. 
That is why the argument that the drafters of the Genocide Convention wanted to encompass 
‘national minorities’, and that the enumerated groups are different faces of that concept, must 
be disregarded. Even if the drafters wanted to protect national minorities, it does not mean 
that the content of the Genocide Convention is determinate. The intention of the drafters 
almost seventy  years ago can not justify the choices we make concerning the crime of 
genocide today. Referring to intellectual distinctions on a theoretical level obscures the fact 
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that the question of which groups to protect is, essentially, a political one. Genocide 
instrumentalises values and interests that are sustained by beliefs about the world. It is 
problematic when the values and interests allowed to permeate the Genocide Convention is in 
divergence with those expressed in the ‘new’ world. 
Notably, as times change, ‘reality’ and discourses regarding what is worth protecting 
change with it. It is understandable why gender groups were not  included at the drafting of 
the Convention. In the mid-1940s, amidst  the smouldering ruins of the Second World War, the 
concepts of gender equality, gender discrimination and gender per se were not widely 
regarded as interests worthy of protection.279 The current discourses in international law do 
not, however, carry  the same lethargy towards gender issues. Gender is covered in all major 
human rights treaties. The current construction of the protected groups can thereby be said to 
be in divergence to the international human rights system. The important point to draw here is 
that the inclusion of gender groups in the international human rights system underlines 
political ambition to combat gender-based discrimination. It is reasonable to assume that such 
political will to protect gender groups from genocide exists, too. There is, however, a clash 
between the interest of combating gender-based discrimination on a genocidal level and the 
interest of States to limit the erga omnes obligation of genocide. How are we to view this 
‘clash’ between political impetus and the State reluctancy on the basis of the erga omnes 
obligation? The answer, I believe, lies in the ‘expressivist’ function of genocide. For the crime 
to retain its legitimacy, it must fit changing social and political trajectories. Thereby, it is 
necessary  to calibrate the crime of genocide in relation to the changing discourses so they 
corroborate, inasmuch it is possible, to ensure that the believability in the judicial construct  is 
preserved. An inclusion of gender groups as protected under Article II could support such an 
undertaking.
7.1.2 The Impact on How Contemporary Atrocities Are Dealt With
There is little, if any, sign today that genocides are on the wane. As argued above, it is 
important that the construction of genocide sustains anchoring in social development. The 
‘gendercidal’ practices in India studied in Section 6.2.1 fulfil both the mens rea and actus reus 
requirements of the crime of genocide in all aspects but one; that of the protected groups. 
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However, in the world today, the ‘Indian gendercide’ – and more broadly serious personal 
violence directed towards women – can be one of two things. It can either never be genocide, 
because gender is not categorised within the canon of Article II, or it can only  be genocide if 
gender is ancillary  to a national, racial, ethnical or religious group. This is problematic on two 
levels. First, the ‘failure to protect […] other groups compromises the integrity  of the Treaty 
and unreasonably restricts the scope of the crime of genocide’.280 Second, in terms of victim 
recognition, the current order does not acknowledge the victims’ experiences of what kind of 
atrocity  they have been subject to. It  is not unrealistic that  ‘gendercides’ could emerge in 
other places. The ‘Indian gendercide’ is hardly unique. The practices in impoverished areas in 
China during its one-child policy  were virtually identical.281 Right now, the State failing to 
protect transgender persons in Russia from being persecuted accentuate the vulnerability  that 
may emanate from one’s gender.282 These narratives reflect  a form of victimisation that ought 
to be accounted for in ICL for it to be à jour with contemporary  atrocities. An inclusion of 
gender groups as protected under the Genocide Convention could promote such a venture.
7.1.3 The ICL System Is Substantively Gendered
The gendercide framework actualises chiefly in respect to women, as it is women who most 
commonly are exposed to ‘gendercidal’ practices, much due to structural positions of 
inequality. That is, for example, the case in the ‘Indian gendercide’. Fundamentally, the issue 
of ‘gendercide’ concerns women’s rights and women’s right to existence. The current 
construction of genocide renders this ‘women’s issue’ unworthy of protection. Thereby, it 
brushes aside the narratives of atrocities suffered by  women. In that, it provides proof that the 
ICL system is gendered by being based on the realities of male lives.283 The groups worthy of 
protection in the Genocide Convention (and the ancillary group  members) are gendered to 
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suit atrocities that has befell men. Such a construction is problematic. The ICL system, and 
the canon of protected groups in the Genocide Convention, are the creations of human beings, 
with its ultimate concern being individual behaviour. It is thought of in terms of a neutral 
construction that  is to be ‘equitably’ applied, or just as the result of a rational decision; but it 
is not so. ICL is permeated by the choices between contesting values and policy 
interpretations. Drawing from feminist legal theory, the absence of women in genocide law 
produces a narrow and insufficient jurisprudence that legitimises the unequal position of 
women worldwide rather than facing it; sustaining patriarchal structures. In consequence, the 
experiences of women are denied access to the continued shaping of ICL, its aims and its 
content. If one believes that such an order is politically  and morally cumbersome; 
constructing gender groups as protected within the Genocide Convention could serve as a 
first step in combating such structures.
Resolving these issues should not be faced with over-confidence to the effects of policy 
changes. A construction that accounts for the experiences of women living such atrocities 
does not automatically  mean that women, or other marginalised gender groups, have gained 
access to the ICL system on a larger scale. More acute is rather which interests that are 
allowed to permeate the ‘types’ of people regarded as worthy  of protection in a legal 
discourse. These problems go beyond how policies are phrased. Currently, however, in the 
words of the feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon, ‘atrocities committed against women are 
either too human to fit the notion of female or too female to fit the notion of human’.284
7.1.4 The Creation of (Stereo)Types
The element of targeting a particular group  is of central interest  within the genocide 
discourse. In consequence, ICL has had to enter into the precarious domain of elaborating 
what constitutes these groups in the first place. The problem here is that groups are social 
phenomena and can not be described, quantified or measured as were they material objects. 
Trying to do so is how typologies of humans are socially constructed. Inherent in this process 
is a ‘search for coherence’, hinged to vague indicators of group affinity, open for 
interpretation in and of themselves.285 It does not require a lot of thinking to realise that these 
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social procedures enable stereotypes, which arise from processes of categorisation, where 
simplicity and order is attempted to be introduced where there is complexity  and nearly 
random variation.286 The thought that different ‘races’ or ‘ethnic’ groups exist in an objective 
manner is a heavily outdated notion. ICL has, quite cleverly, solved that issue by virtue of 
constructing the subjective approach in matters of group identification. Still, complexities 
ensue. First, it  has been argued that the socially constructed labels ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ were 
created in the 20th century  to support undertakings of colonisation and domination.287 
Thereby, if such collectives exist  as quite vicious social constructs, should ICL protect them 
‘as such’, instead of labelling them historically constructed collectives? The genocide in 
Rwanda underlines these complexities. The genocide itself affirmed colonialist claims; that 
the Tutsi is an ethnic group. Despite prosecuting the Hutu génocidaires and thereby 
‘protecting’ the Tutsi group, the post-genocide government shied away from acknowledging 
that ethnicity itself lies at the heart of the problem.288
Secondly, there is the problem that ICL may  reinforce characteristics that are oppressive 
per se within these groups, which can emanate from an attempt to protect certain groups. The 
intersection of gender to this rationale is highly relevant here. Turning to historical genocides, 
the notion that the Tutsi or Bosnian Muslim groups were destroyed through the use of rape 
because the rape victims (who were women) would be excluded from the collective appears 
to crystallise traits that undoubtedly  oppress women inside the group. The assumption here is 
that the dissolution of the target group is, in part, the result  of an internal process where the 
group members take part in its own destruction. This is achieved through the belief of a 
gender vis-a-vis gender antagonism that augment the scheme of the génocidaires. To hold 
such traits as natural truths of ethnicity render them invisible and makes them harder to 
contest, as a consequence of being incorporated in the narrative of victimisation. The 
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incorporation may oversimplify, even caricature ‘ethnicity’ and gender alike, through 
constructing Bosnian Muslim and Tutsi men as inherently prone to exclude rape victims.289 
The complexities above show that applying and approaching the categorisation of people 
always creates types. In dealing with different types of human beings, there is the inherent 
risk of creating stereotypes, which may  reproduce oppressive traits and operate to sustain 
status quo orderings. This relates to the theoretical plausibility  of including gender groups 
within the ambit of the Genocide Convention in the sense that an addition of ‘gender’ to the 
canon of protected groups would add a dimension to the ‘face’ of the protected groups. In 
that, the addition could expand the imagined victim subject(s), diminishing the risk of 
constructing stereotypes due to a narrowly construed legal framework.
 7.1.5 The Tension Between Formalism and Instrumentalism
The current legal architecture of the protected groups in the Genocide Convention highlights 
the tension between formalism and instrumentalism within ICL. The schism is important in 
answering what the crime of genocide, and more broadly ICL, is for. In this regard, Martti 
Koskenniemi notes that,
[f]rom the instrumental perspective, international law exists to realise objectives of some dominant part 
of the [international society]; from the formalist perspective, it provides a platform to evaluate behaviour, 
including the behaviour of those in dominant positions. The instrumental perspective highlights the role 
of law as social engineering, formalism views it as an interpretative scheme.290
The current order in the international society ‘is not one of pre-established harmony or 
struggle but of both cooperation and conflict simultaneously’.291  Thereby, ‘[a] form and a 
process is needed that channels interpretative conflicts into peaceful avenues’.292  There are 
quite substantial problems inherent in pragmatic instrumentalism. There is ‘the extreme case 
of the “war against terrorism” to canvas the slippery  slope from anti-formal reasoning to 
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human rights violation’.293 As such, it  seems appropriate to opt for a prevailing view of legal 
formalism in lieu of an instrumental ditto.
The prevalent formalist conceptualisation of the crime of genocide can thereby be 
understood as a form of protection from the imposition of objectives of some dominant part 
of the international society. However, a too formalist approach is a recipe for indifference and 
may risk turning the judicial construction stale. Formalism needs to be followed with a 
waking appreciation of its political underpinnings. There is thus reason to move beyond the 
dichotomy of formalism vis-à-vis instrumentalism in order to strike a balance between the 
different interests that ICL represent.294 A starting point for such a quest could be to recognise 
ICL as a ‘political project’, acknowledging openly the ‘battlefield for hegemony’.295 
Inherent is the realisation that there is no fixed set of objectives, purposes or principles 
that can be unearthed ‘outside’ or externally  from ICL per se.296 Instead, these objectives can 
not be anything than those of different legal actors with different hegemonic quests. ICL, and 
the crime of genocide, is an instrument, but what it is an instrument for can not be settled in 
isolation from the political processes of which it is a complex part  of. That  is why the 
objectives of ICL and its criminal constructions, moreover, is ICL in itself; and as a promise 
of ‘justice’. ICL and justice are connected in the conduct of legal actors, ‘paradigmatically in 
the legal judgement’.297 The judgment, however, is insufficient to ‘bridge’ positive law and 
justice. Therefore, in the rift between ICL and justice lies the inevitable realm of politics law. 
It must be so, or else law becomes sheer positivity. That is why the question of whether 
including gender groups under the Genocide Convention is theoretically  plausible should be 
addressed for what it is. It is not about objectives from diplomatic instruments or academic 
treatises, it  is a question of political struggle. In turn, the ‘true’ inquiry becomes; is it 
politically  motivated to protect gender groups from genocide? That, I would like to argue, 
should be answered affirmatively  – and it is this rationale that renders an inclusion of gender 
groups as protected under the Genocide Convention to appear theoretically plausible.
81
293 Ibid, pp. 249-250.
294 Cf. Mikael Baaz, ‘Human Rights or Human Wrongs? Towards a “Thin” Universal Code of Human Rights for 
the Twenty-first Century’, 20(2) Juridisk Tidskrift (2008/2009), pp. 411-433.
295 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, supra n. 3, p. 263.
296 Ibid, p. 263.
297 Ibid, p. 263-264.
7.2 Suggestions for Further Research
It falls outside the scope of the thesis to provide policy  recommendations or to suggest what 
practically  ‘should’ be done. I have made such a decision in order to not having my work 
reduced to just a proposal. I could have suggested that the ‘best way forward’ is to create an 
Optional Protocol to the Genocide Convention that States could ratify, if they wanted to. That, 
I will not do. The purpose of the thesis is to investigate whether including gender groups as a 
protected group in the Genocide Convention is theoretically plausible. My hope is that 
pointing to the theoretical plausibility  of including gender groups as protected in the 
Genocide Convention provides a meaningful contribution as concerns the application of the 
concept of genocide to gender groups. Notably, such an investigation is achieved without 
making policy  claims. As an ancillary  contribution, I wish to contribute to future research of 
similar issues. As such, I will provide suggestions for further research, justified by my study.
Throughout, the thesis has underlined close nexus between ICL and politics. The 
suggestions will continue in a similar vein. First, an interesting quest would be to ponder the 
relation between ‘gendercide’ as a theoretical framework and civil-society-based resistance. 
Actualising ‘gendercide’ against the backdrop  of resistance could, more than studying the 
interconnectivity between genocide and gender, uncover strategies of the negotiation of 
gendered norms. The research could, ultimately, contribute with knowledge about how 
resistance can achieve social change. Such a point of departure could be very fruitful in the 
setting of the Genocide Convention, as it  surely can be used as a tool for resistance.298 
Against this background, it could also prove beneficial to deviate from the paradigmatic form 
of studying genocide, which is essentially people sitting in libraries reading what other people 
in libraries have written. There is reason for future research to employ a ‘multisited 
ethnography’; to study the phenomenon in various spaces. This could sketch a nuanced 
picture of what ‘gendercides’ are, and how people who live them perceive them. Lastly, it is 
my contention the analytical framework developed herein is generalisable. Thereby, I believe 
it capable of being applied onto other collectives. It would be interesting to further challenge 
the underpinnings of the four enumerated groups as sui generis, through actualising people 
with disabilities, or perhaps groups based on sexual orientation in light of this discussion.
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8 Completion
The Genocide Convention acknowledges that some facets of collective life are constitutional 
for human identity  to the extent that freedom from physical and biological destruction is 
warranted to ensure their existence ‘as such’. At its core, ICL is a consent-based system. Its 
survival is dependent upon States accepting not only  its jurisprudence – but also the moral 
and political ramifications thereof. The concept of ‘gendercide’, and its interconnectivity  with 
genocide, ostensibly emerge as problematic for the international society  as a whole and ICL 
in a systemic manner. The complexities surfaced here are of a wholly political character. That 
is not inherently detrimental, but ICL should be responsive enough to handle contemporary 
challenges. If it does not, it runs a risk of throwing a shade of illegitimacy over the entire 
system. In the same way that the criminal label ‘murder’ can not accurately communicate the 
atrocities transpired in the Holocaust, it can not accurately describe ‘gendercide’. With that 
said, it  should not be interpreted that introducing a ‘new’ crime of ‘gendercide’ is a cure-all 
for such dilemmas. Not at all. There is reason to stress that, even though ‘gendercide’ fits the 
theoretical underpinnings of international criminal regulation, these issues ought not to be 
faced with over-confidence to the effects of policy changes. A construction that accounts for 
the reality of such conduct does not automatically  render the issue of ‘gendercide’ resolved. 
ICL is an insufficient system to cure all the woe in the world. Nor should it be anticipated to 
be able to. The law, and perhaps especially ICL, will always provide inadequate tools for 
dealing with genocide. Indeed, in the words of Hannah Arendt:
For these crimes,  no punishment is severe enough. It may as well be essential to hang Göring, but it is 
totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all 
legal systems.299
Notwithstanding the imperfections of ICL, there is reason to do something rather than 
nothing. Apathy, too, takes its toll. The omission to protect gender groups from genocide is a 
choice. This political choice is purchased at the cost of lost legitimacy  of ICL. That is a price, 
as it stands today, it can not afford to pay. Let us return to the narrative in the introduction; the 
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community  who adopted a one-child policy, with the ancillary requirement that this one child 
must be male. Legal terminology of inclusion and exclusion transforms and renders the 
victim group less worth protecting than national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. The 
attack on the group – the girls of the community – remains unseen.
Drawing from feminist legal theory, the current construction of the protected groups in the 
Genocide Convention provides substantial proof for the gendered nature of the ICL system by 
being based on the realities of male atrocities. Furthermore, it explicates a systemic 
favouritism of gender discrimination over discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, 
race or religion. In the end, the omission to protect gender groups from genocide represents a 
lacuna within ICL. If one believes that this lacuna ought to be filled, an inclusion of gender 
groups as protected in the Genocide Convention appears theoretically plausible. After all, to 
quote Raphael Lemkin, ‘if the destruction of human groups is a problem of international 
concern, then such acts should be treated as crimes under the law of nations’.300
84
300 Raphael Lemkin, supra n. 49, p. 146.
Bibliography
Books
Aravamudan, Gita. Disappearing Daughters: The Tragedy of Female Foeticide. New Delhi: 
 Penguin Books, 2007.
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking 
 Press, 1963.
Arvidsson, Matilda. The Subject in International Law: The Administrator of the Coalition 
 Provisional Authority of Occupied Iraq and its Laws. Lund: Lund University, 2016.
Asp, Petter, Ulväng, Magnus and Jareborg, Nils. Kriminalrättens grunder [The Foundations 
 of Criminal Law]. Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2010.
Baaz, Mikael, Lilja, Mona and Vinthagen, Stellan (eds). Researching Resistance and Social 
 Change: A Critical Approach to Theory and Practice. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 
 2017.
Baaz, Mikael. The Use of Force and International Society. Stockholm: Jure Förlag AB, 2017.
Beauvoir, Simone de. The Second Sex. New York: Vintage Books, 1952.
Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds). The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: 
 Clarendon Press, 1984.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto and Zizek, Slavoj (eds). Contingency, Hegemony, 
 Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso, 2000.
Brody, Reed and Ratner, Michael. The Pinochet Papers – The Case of Augusto Pinochet in 
 Spain and Britain. London: Kluwer, 2000.
Cassese, Antonio, Acquaviva, Guido, Akande, Dapo, Baig, Laurel, Bing, Jia Bing, Cryer, 
 Robert, Dé, Urmila, Gaeta, Paola, Geneuss, Julia and Gustafson, Katrina. The Oxford 
 Companion to International Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Chalk, Frank and Jonassohn, Kurt (eds). The History and Sociology of Genocide. New 
 Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
85
Charlesworth, Hilary and Chinkin, Christine. The Boundaries of International Law. 
 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
Cryer, Robert, Friman, Håkan, Robinson, Darryl and Wilmshurst, Elizabeth. An Introduction 
 to International Criminal Law and Procedure. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2014.
Dahlberg-Larsen, Jørgen. Pragmatisk Retsteori (København: Jurist & Økonomforbundets 
 forlag, 2001.
Drost, Pieter N. The Crime of State: Vol. II – Genocide. Leiden: A.W Synthoff, 1959.
Eboe-Osuji, Chile. International Law and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts. Leiden, 
 Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.
Eboe-Osuji, Chile (ed). Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in 
 Honour of Navanethem Pillay. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010.
Fairclough, Norman. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. New York: 
 Routledge, 2003.
Feldman, Ilana and Ticktin, Miriam (eds). In the Name of Humanity: The Government of 
 Threat and Care. London: Duke University Press, 2010.
Guibernau, Montserrat and Rex, John. The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism 
 and Migration. Oxford: Polity, 1997.
Gunnarsson, Åsa and Svensson, Eva-Maria. Genusrättsvetenskap. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 
 2009.
Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs and Women. The Reinvention of Nature. New York: 
 Routledge, 1991.
Jones, Adam. Gendercide and Genocide. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004.
Jones, Adam. New Directions in Genocide Research. London: Routledge, 2012.
Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak. International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 
 2001.
86
Kohler, Lotte and Saner, Hans (eds). Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence 
 1926-1969. New York: Mariner Books, 1992.
Korling, Fredric and Zamboni, Mauro. Juridisk metodlära [Legal Methodology]. Lund: 
 Studentlitteratur, 2013.
Koskenniemi, Martti. The Politics of International Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011.
Lacey, Nicola. Unspeakable Subjects – Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory. Oxford: 
 Hart Publishing, 1988
Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington: Carnegie, 1944.
Luhmann, Niklas. Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. Studien zur Wissensoziologie der 
 modernen Gesellschaft [Social Structure and Semantics. Studies on the Knowledge 
 Sociology of Modern Society], 3rd edition. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989.
Lundquist, Lennart. Demokratins Väktare [The Guardians of Democracy]. Lund: 
 Studentlitteratur, 1998.
Lundquist, Lennart. Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik [The Scientific Study of Politics]. 
 Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1993.
Moberg, Andreas. Om Villkorsklausuler. Uppsala: Iustus, 2009. 
Nersessian, David L. Genocide and Political Groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Novic, Elisa. The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Perspective. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2016.
Schabas, William A. Genocide in International Law. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2009.
Sekher, T.V and Hatti, Neelambar (eds). Unwanted Daughters: Gender Discrimination in 
 Modern India. New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2010.
Soifer, Aviam. Law and the Company We Keep. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Staub, Ervin. The Roots of Evil – The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
87
Tajfel, Henri. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. 
 Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Taylor, Telford. Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes 
 Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10. Buffalo: WS Hein, 1949.
Totani, Yuma. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War 
 II. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009.
Van Dijk, Teun A. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: SAGE Publications, 
 1998).
Warren, Mary  Anne. Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection. Maryland: Rowman and 
 Littlefield, 1985.
Werle, Gerhard and Jessberger, Florian. Principles of International Criminal Law, 3rd 
 edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.
Yudell, Michael. Race Unmasked: Biology and Race in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
 Columbia University Press, 2014.
Chapters
Eltringham, Nigel. ‘The Past is Elsewhere: The Paradoxes of Proscribing Ethnicity in 
 Post-Genocide Rwanda’. In Straus, Scott and Waldorf, Lars. Remaking Rwanda. 
 Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, pp. 269-282.
Glavå, Mats and Petrusson, Ulf. ‘Illusionen om rätten! – juristprofessionen och ansvaret för 
 rättskonstruktionerna [The Illusion of Law! – The Lawyer’s Profession and the 
 Responsibility for the Legal Constructions]’. In Askeland, Bjarte and Bernt, Jan-
 Fridthiof (eds), Erkjennelse og engasjement: minneseminar for David Roland Doublet 
 (1954-2000) [Recognition and Engagement: Memorandum of David Roland Doublet 
 (1954-2000)]. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2002, pp. 109-151.
Kimminich, Otto. History of the Law of Nations Since World War II. In Encyclopaedia of 
 Public International Law by Rudolf Bernhardt (eds). New York: North Holland, 1993, 
 pp. 252-262.
88
Laban Hinton, Alexander. ‘The Dark Side of Modernity’. In Laban Hilton, Alexander (ed) 
 Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide. Berkeley: University of 
 California Press, 2002, pp. 1-43.
Lampe, Ernst-Joachim. ‘Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit [Crimes Against Humanity]’. 
 In Hirsch, Hans-Joachim (ed). Festschrift für Günter Kohlmann zum 70. Geburtstag 
 [Homage Volume for Günther Kohlmann, on his 70th birthday]. Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto 
 Schmidt, 2003. pp. 147-176.
Mégret, Frédéric. ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’. In Schwöbel, 
 Christine (ed). Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction. 
 New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 17-54.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. ‘On Genocide’. In Falk, Richard A., Kolko, Gabriel and Lifton, Robert Jay 
 (eds). Crimes of War New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 534-550.
Articles 
Akhavan, Payam. ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
 Atrocities’. In 95(1) American Journal of International Law (2001), pp. 7-31.
Amann, Dianne Marie. ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism and Genocide’. In 2(2) International 
 Criminal Law Review (2002), pp. 93-144.
Anderson, Kenneth. ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended 
 Consequences’. In 20(2) European Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 331-358.
Baaz, Mikael. Human Rights or Human Wrongs? Towards a ‘Thin’ Universal Code of Human 
 Rights for the Twenty-first Century. In 20(2) Juridisk Tidskrift (2008/2009), pp. 
 411-433.
Bednar, Nicholas R. and Penland, Margaret. ‘Asylum’s Interpretative Impasse: Interpreting 
 Persecution and Particular Social Group Using International Human Rights Law’. In 
 26(1) Minnesota Journal of International Law (2017), pp. 145-188.
Brownlie, Ian. ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law.’ In 9(2) Bulletin of the 
 Australian Society of Legal Philosophy (1985), pp. 104-119.
89
Beres, Loui Rene. ‘Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Prevention of 
 Genocide’.  In 33(1) American Journal of Jurisprudence (1988), pp. 123-160.
Carpenter, Charli. ‘Beyond “Gendercide”: Incorporating Gender into Comparative 
 Gendercide Studies’. In 6(4) The International Journal of Human Rights (2002), pp. 
 77-101.
Cassese, Antonio. ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’. In 9(1) Journal of 
 International Criminal Justice (2011), pp. 271-280.
Cohen, Stanley A. ‘An Introduction to the Theory, Justifications and Modern Manifestations 
 of Criminal Punishment’. In 27(1) McGill Law Journal (1981), pp. 73-91.
Cosmides, Leda, Tooby, John and Kurzban, Robert. ‘Perceptions of Race’. In 7(4) Trends in 
 Cognitive Sciences (2003), pp. 173-179.
Daly, Erin. ‘Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation’. In 12(1) International 
 Legal Perspective (2001-2002), pp. 73-184.
Damaska, Mirjan. ‘What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ In 83(1) Chicago- 
 Kent Law Review (2008), pp. 329-365.
Garet, Ronald R. ‘Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups’. In 56(5) Southern 
 California Law Review (1983), pp. 1001-1078.
Harff, Barbara and Gurr, Ted Robert. ‘Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and 
 Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945’. In 32(3) 
 International Studies Quarterly (1988), pp. 351-371.
Hassan, Farooq. ‘The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law’. In 
 15(1) Case Western Journal of International Law (1983), pp. 39-60.
Holslag, Anthonie. ‘The Process of Othering from the “Social Imaginaire” to Physical Acts: 
 an Anthropological Approach’. In 9(1) Genocide Studies and Prevention (2015), pp. 
 96-113.
Holter, Øystein. ‘A Theory of Gendercide’. In 4(1) Journal of Genocide Research (2002), pp. 
 11-38.
90
Kaptein, Hendrik. ‘Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy 
 and E Contrario’. In 19(4) Argumentation (2005), pp. 497-507.
Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘What is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating 
 Structuralism’. In 29(3) Leiden Journal of International Law (2016), pp. 727-735.
Kritz, Brian. ‘The Global Transgender Population and the International Criminal Court’. In 
 17(1) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal (2014), pp. 1-38.
Lemkin, Raphael. ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law’. In 41(1) American 
 Journal of International Law (1947), pp. 145-151.
Luban, David. ‘A Theory  of Crimes Against Humanity’. In 29(1) Yale Journal of 
 International Law (2004), pp. 85-168.
Lippman, Matthew. ‘The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
 Genocide: Fifty Years Later’. In 15(2) Arizona Journal of International and 
 Comparative Law (1998), pp. 415-514.
MacKinnon, Catharine. ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’. 17(1) Harvard 
 Women’s Law Journal (1994), pp. 5-16.
Moberg, Andreas. ‘Liv’. In 8(1) No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and 
 Justice (2011), pp. 135-141.
Moi, Toril. ‘Vad är en kvinna? Kön och genus i feministisk teori [What is a woman? Sex and 
 Gender in Feminist Theory]’. In 35(1) Res Publica (1995), pp. 71-158.
Nersessian, David L. ‘The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups under the 
 Genocide Convention’. In 36(2) Cornell International Law Journal (2003), pp. 
 293-328.
Ratner, Steven R. ‘The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years: Contemporary Strategies for 
 Combating a Crime Against Humanity’. In 92(1) American Society of International 
 Law Proceedings (1998), pp. 1-2.
Schabas, William A. ‘Genocide and Political Groups by David L. Nersessian [Reviews]’. In 
 21(1) Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2010), pp. 345-352.
91
Stein, Stuart. ‘Geno- and Other Cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation’. In 
 4(1) Journal of Genocide Research (2002), pp. 39-63.
Tiefenbrun, Susan and Edwards, Christie J. ‘Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex 
 Trafficking in China’. In 32(3) Fordham International Law Journal (2009), pp. 
 731-780.
Tomuschat, Christian. ‘The Legacy  of Nuremberg’. In 4(4) International Criminal Justice 
 (2006), pp. 830-844.
Van Schaack, Beth. ‘The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Convention’s Blind 
 Spot’. In 106(7) Yale Law Journal (1997), pp. 2259-2292.
Webb, John. ‘Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide 
 Convention to Alleged Crimes in the former Yugoslavia’. In 23(2) Georgia Journal of 
 International and Comparative Law (1993), pp. 377-408.
Zunino, Marcos. ‘Subversive Justice: The Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal and 
 Transitional Justice’. In 10(2) International Journal of Transitional Justice (2016), pp. 
 211-229.
International Treaties
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European 
 Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), annex, 
 (1951) 82 UNTS 279 (‘IMT Charter’).
Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (‘UN Charter’).
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. UNGA Res 260 
 (III) (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277 (‘Genocide Convention’).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
 November 1950) 218 UNTS 262 (‘ECHR’).
Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 
 (‘ICCPR’).
92
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998), 2187 UNTS 90 (‘Rome 
 Statute’).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 (‘VCLT’).
National Legislation
Code Penal, Article 211(1) (France).
Law No 8-98 (31 Oct 1998), C1, Article 1 [Genocide] (Congo).
Penal Code C2, Article 313 (Burkina Faso)
UN Documents and Resolutions (appearing chronologically)
UNGA Resolution 96(1) ‘The Crime of Genocide’ (11 December 1946) UN Doc A/BUR/50.
ECOSOC Resolution 47(IV) ‘Crime of Genocide’ (28 March 1947) UN Doc E/325.
Opinion of the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its 
 Codification (17 Jun 1947) UN Doc E/447.
ECOSOC Resolution 77(V) ‘Genocide’ (6 August 1947).
ECOSOC Resolution 117(VI) ‘Genocide’ (3 March 1948) UN Doc E/734
Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Records (5 April–10 May 1948) UN Docs E/AC.
 25/SR.13.
Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide Submitted by  the Delegation of the Union of 
 Soviet Socialist Republics’ (7 April 1948) UN Doc E/AC25/7.
‘Draft articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by  the Delegation of 
 China’ (16 April 1948) UN Doc E/AC.25/9.
‘Prevention and Punishment of Genocide–Comments by Governments on the Draft 
 Convention Prepared by the Secretariat’ (19 April 1948) UN Doc E/623/Add2.
‘Proposal of the Delegation of the United States of America’ (1 October 1948) UN Doc A/C.
 6/208.
‘USSR: Amendments to the draft convention on genocide (E/794)’ (4 October 1948), UN Doc 
 A/C.6/215/Rev1.
93
‘Sixty-Sixth Meeting’ (4 October 1948), UN Doc A/C.6/SR.66.
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ UNGA Res 217-A (III) (10 December 1948), UN 
 Doc A/810.
ILC, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
 and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.- A/1950/Add.1 (1950).
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954) UN Doc A/CN4/
 SERA/1954.
Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, prepared 
 by Nicodème Ruhashyamiko, July 4, 1978, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416.
‘Study on Implementing Apartheid Convention’ (1981) UN Doc E/CN4/1426.
‘Benjamin Whitaker, “Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and 
 punishment of the crime of genocide”.’ UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985.
UNSC Resolution 827 ‘Tribunal (Yugoslavia)’ (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827.
UNSC Resolution 955 ‘Tribunal (Rwanda)’ (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955.
‘ICC Ad Hoc Committee Report’ (6 September 1995) UN Doc A/50/22.
‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 
 May–26 July 1996’, UN Doc. A/51/10.
International Case Law (appearing chronologically)
Prosecutor v. Alstötter et al. (1947) 3 TWC 1 (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg–Case No 
 3) (‘Justice [USMT 1947]’).
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in The Trial of German Major War 
 Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, 
 Germany, Part 22, London, (1950).
Nottebohm, Judgement of 6 April [1955] ICJ Reports.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T. Judgment, 2 September 1998.
94
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S. Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 
 1998.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T. Judgment, 21 May 1999.
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T. Judgment, 6 December 1999.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. ICTY-95-10-T. Judgment, 14 December 1999. 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T. Judgment, 14 January 2000
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. ICTY-95-14/1-A. Judgment, 24 March 2000.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. ICTY-98–33-T. Judgment, 2 August 2001.
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98–44A-T. Judgment and Sentence, 1 December 
 2003.
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S. Judgment, 2 December 2003
Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. ICTY-95-14/2-A. Appeal Judgment, 17 December 
 2004.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (2007)) ICJ Judgment of 26 
 February 2007.
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A. Judgment, 28 May 2008.
Reports
NIPCCD. A Socio-Cultural Study of  the Declining Sex Ratio in Delhi and Haryana. New 
 Delhi: National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, 2008. 
 Available at: http://nipccd.nic.in/reports/esratio.pdf, accessed 30 November 2017.
Society for the Protection of the Girl Child. An Overview of Gendercide and Daughter Abuse 
 in India. New Delhi: Society for the Protection of the Girl Child, 2011. Available at: 
 http://bit.ly/2BHkvth, accessed 23 November 2017.
95
UNESCO, Four Statements on the Race Question. Paris: UNESCO, 1969. Available 
 at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001577/157732eb.pdf, accessed 14 
 October 2017.
Websites
Gendercide Watch. History of ‘gendercide’. Available at: http://www.gendercide.org/
 what_is_gendercide.html, accessed 20 October 2017.
HeinOnline, database. Available at: https://home.heinonline.org/, accessed 21 December 
 2017.
Lingaas, Caroline. ‘Defining the Protected Groups of Genocide Through Case Law of 
 International Courts, 2015’. In ICD Brief 18 December 2015, pp. 1-18, accessed 10 
 October 2017.
Nersessian, David L. ‘Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law’. In Human 
 Rights Dialogue: ‘Cultural Rights’ (Spring 2005). Available at: https://
 www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139, 
 accessed 2 November 2017.
Rafter, Nicole and Bell, Kristin A. ‘Gender and Genocide’. Paper presented at the American 
 Society of Criminology, Presidential Panel Sessions of 2013. Found at: https://
 www.asc41.com/Annual_Meet ing/2013/President ia l%20Papers /Rafter,
 %20Nicole-Bell,%20Kristin.pdf, accessed 25 September 2017.
Schabas, William A. ‘The Genocide Convention at Fifty’. In United States Institute of Peace 
 Report 41. Found at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr990107.pdf 
 2017-09-15, accessed 15 September 2017.
UN Case Law Database, database. Available at: http://cld.unmict.org/, accessed 18 October 
 2017.
96
I, Filip  Hassellind, first registered on the Master’s thesis course, 30 ECTS, fall semester 2017. 
I have not been registered on the course previously, or participated in any  examinations 
before this one.
97
